LIBRARY
SUPREME COURT, U. S.

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
APR 13 1964
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1963

No. 997

MARY GREEN and EDWIN GREEN, JR.,
as Administrator of the Estate of
EDWIN GREEN, Deceased,

Petitioners,

-v-

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,

Respondent.

CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Neal Rutledge
601 Flagler Federal Building
111 N. E. First Street
Miami, Florida 33132

Lawrence V. Hastings
312 Biscayne Building
Miami, Florida 33132

Counsel for Petitioners

Stanley Milledge
Irma Feder

Of Counsel

INDEX

	Page
Citation to Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented	2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Involved	4
Statement of the Case	5
Argument (Reasons for Granting the Writ)	8
Conclusion	15
Certificate of Service	16
Appendix	App. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:	Page
Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co. (Fla. 1944), 19 So. 2d 313	10, 12
Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corporation (Fla. 1949), 39 So.2d 476	10, 14
Dalehite v. United States (1953), 346 U.S. 15	12
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64	3, 8, 12
Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan (Fla. 1953), 62 So. 2d 910	10
Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co. (Fla. 1953), 63 So. 2d 514	10
Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 5 Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 19	9, 10
Sencer v. Carl's Market (Fla. 1950), 45 So.2d 671	10
Swift v. Tyson (1842), 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865	15
Other Authorities:	
Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 2d 39	10
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(b)	4, 7
Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 315	12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1963

No. _____

MARY GREEN and EDWIN GREEN, JR.,
as Administrator of the Estate of
EDWIN GREEN, Deceased,

Petitioners,

-v-

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,

Respondent.

CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered December 11, 1963 on the Questions herein presented.

Citation to Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1963, printed in Appendix D hereto, infra, App. p. 49, is reported at 325 F.2d 673. The original opinion of the Court of Appeals, printed in Appendix A hereto, infra,

App. p. 1, is reported at 304 F.2d 70. The opinion of the Court of Appeals granting appellants' petition for rehearing is printed in Appendix B hereto, infra, App. p. 37, and is reported at 304 F.2d 85. The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, rendered on certification of the Court of Appeals after rehearing was granted, is printed in Appendix C hereto, infra, App. p. 41, and is reported in 154 So.2d 169.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on December 11, 1963, and is printed in Appendix E hereto, infra, App. p. 71. By Order of Mr. Justice Black, dated March 6, 1964, the time for filing this petition was extended to and including April 14, 1964. The jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).

Questions Presented

1. Where the Court of Appeals rules in a Florida diversity case that defendant's cigarettes, which proximately caused their consumer to die, can still be found with consistency to be "*reasonably* fit and wholesome" for human consumption, does not the Court of Appeals decide an important question of Florida warranty law in conflict with Florida decisions, and particularly with the advisory opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in this case, there being no evidence or contention in this case that plaintiffs' decedent (the consumer) was unusual or that he smoked the cigarettes in an unusual way and all of the medical evidence produced, both pro and con, concerned the issue of whether cigarettes like defendant's frequently can and do cause lung cancer?

2. In a diversity case in which the Court of Appeals obtains an advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme Court that Florida law imposes absolute liability on a cigarette manufacturer for death proximately caused by smoking its cigarettes (all disputed facts in the question certified to the Florida Supreme Court having been specially found by the jury), does not the Court of Appeals violate the rule and spirit of **Erie R. Co. vs. Tompkins**, (1938), 304 U.S. 64, by holding that, despite the lethal effect of the cigarettes on plaintiffs' decedent, the plaintiffs must additionally prove the cigarettes are not "reasonably" fit and wholesome as to the public generally when:

A. No reported decision by any Florida court indicates, by dicta or holding, the necessity for such proof;

B. The requirement for such proof is contrary to the stated public policy and the law of Florida as expressed in the advisory opinion in this case;

C. The finding of the jury on proximate cause, in light of the evidence and issues in this case, already and necessarily establishes that plaintiffs' decedent's death from smoking cigarettes was not a unique reaction peculiar to himself; and

D. Under Florida law the implied warranty of reasonable fitness (which a manufacturer is held to make) runs to the individual consumer who is proximately harmed, not the general public en masse?

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Involved

Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

> "(b) General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories. The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58. When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial."

Statement of the Case

Edwin M. Green sued American Tobacco Company in December 1957, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for breach of implied warranty causing lung cancer as a result of smoking defendant's product, Lucky Strike cigarettes. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, Green being a citizen of Florida and the defendant being a New Jersey corporation. After Mr. Green's death on February 25, 1958, the case was continued by his Administrator. Decedent's widow filed suit under the Florida wrongful death statute. Both actions were consolidated for trial and on appeal. All theories of liability originally alleged, including negligence, are now immaterial except for implied warranty. The trial court submitted to the jury the following interrogatories:

"(1) Did the decedent Green have primary cancer in his left lung? Yes."

"(2) Was the cancer in his left lung the cause or one of the causes of his death? Yes."

"(3) Was the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent Green a proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the development of cancer in his left lung? Yes."

"(4) Could the defendant on or prior to February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known the users of Lucky Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent Green, would be endangered by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung? No."

The jury answered the first three interrogatories in the affirmative and the fourth in the negative. The District Court's charge to the jury required the general verdict to be for the defendant unless the jury could answer the fourth interrogatory in the affirmative. The Court of appeals, 5th Circuit, first thinking that the charge correctly stated the law of Florida, affirmed the judgment by a divided court,[1] but upon rehearing certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the following question:

> "Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not, on or prior to February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the mainstream smoke from such cigarettes of contracting cancer of the lung?" Answer: Yes

The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the affirmative:

> "Upon the critical point, our decisions conclusively establish the principle that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his lia-

[1] The late Judge Cameron dissenting.

bility on the theory of implied warranty, and the question certified must therefore be answered in the affirmative." 154 So.2d 169.

This answer of the Florida Supreme Court required a reversal, but the question still remained as to the scope of a new trial. The plaintiffs argued that in view of Florida law the answers to interrogatories 1, 2 and 3 left no issue of fact on liability to be decided.[2] The defendant argued for a complete new trial. The Court of Appeals accepted neither argument and decided that although there was proof that the incidence of lung cancer among cigarette smokers was twenty times higher than among non-smokers, in the absence of a specific finding by a jury that the defendant's cigarettes were not reasonably fit and proper for human consumption as to the public generally, the case should be retried by a second jury to determine that question. The Court held that it was possible that the same cigarettes which proximately caused Green to die from lung cancer might also be found "*reasonably* fit and wholesome" for human consumption, and the two findings

---

[2]This contention was made in the District Court by plaintiffs' post-trial motion for judgment under Rule 49(b) [R. 1149-1158] and was asserted on appeal as plaintiffs-appellants' first question (see first opinion of Court of Appeals, 304 F.2d at 72). As respondent concedes (footnote, p. 14 of its Petition), Rule 49(b) does provide that where the jury's answers are consistent with each other, but inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered in accordance with the answers, but may not be entered in accordance with the general verdict. In such circumstances the specific answers of the jury are deemed a more accurate determination than the general verdict. These are precisely the circumstances plaintiffs submit are present in this case under the Florida Supreme Court's advisory opinion — i.e., the jury's answers are consistent with each other, but are inconsistent with the general verdict.

Judge Cameron dissenting on the basis of his consistent position that plaintiffs had established liability by the jury's special answers to the jury interrogatories.

would be consistent with each other. Obviously the only way this is conceivable would be for the jury to find the cigarettes reasonably fit and wholesome for the public generally, albeit unwholesome and lethal for Green.

Argument

Petitioners respectfully submit that the Court of Appeals in its December 11, 1963, opinion has decided an important question of Florida law in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, including the advisory opinion rendered in this case, and in violation of the Constitutional rule of **Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins**, (1938), 304 U.S. 64. While the departure of the Court of Appeals from Florida law in its second opinion is neither so total nor so drastic to petitioners in its consequences as was the first opinion,[4] petitioners submit that both opinions stem from the same basic fault: a failure or an inability of the Court of Appeals to accept and apply the Florida law of absolute liability for breach of implied warranty. Persistently the Court of Appeals continues in its second opinion, despite the Florida Supreme Court's advisory opinion, to mix concepts of negligence law—of foreseeability and knowledge—into an area of Florida warranty law where such concepts have been rejected. This happened in the trial court;[5] it happened in the Court of

---

[4] The first opinion would have resulted in a final judgment against petitioners; the second opinion requires proof and a finding either on a matter already and necessarily found by the jury or on a matter not required by Florida law.

[5] The District Court, Judge Choate, stated his views to counsel as follows (R. 1059):

"The question here is whether or not these cigarettes contained a substance — first, whether he died of a primary heart lesion or cancer in the left lung; second, whether or not it was caused by his smoking

Appeals before rehearing; and it has now happened again in the Court's second opinion.

Where the Court of Appeals departs from Florida law is in the following passage from its opinion:

> "The jury has not made any sufficient finding on the question of reasonableness, that is, as to whether or not the cigarettes were *'reasonably* fit and wholesome.' The jury did find that the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent, Green, was a proximate cause of the development of cancer in his left lung which caused his death. *It is possible, however, that those findings are consistent with the standard of reasonableness*, for as this Court recently said: 'Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without regard to negligence, "does not mean that goods are warranted to be foolproof or incapable of producing injury. * * * "' **Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company**, 5 Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 19, 37." 325 F.2d at 677. (Second emphasis added.)

In other words, the Court says a jury could consistently find that cigarettes which *proximately* cause death are "*reasonably* fit and wholesome" for human consumption. Petitioners respectfully suggest that this is not true under Florida law for the following reasons:

---

of these cigarettes; and, thirdly whether or not these people knew that they contained these substances.

"Now, I think your law is as simple as that. * * * "

Plaintiffs objected that knowledge was relevant only as to negligence (R. 1072). The Court rejected this contention on the ground such a holding "would wipe out every stockholder in the whiskey and tobacco industry." (R. 1073).

1. The Court of Appeals significantly at this crucial part of its decision cites only its own decision in the **Lartigue** case, a Louisiana diversity case. But the law of Florida in this area is candidly a minority position. See **Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co, vs. Jordan** (Fla. 1953), 62 So.2d 910, 911; see also Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 2d 39, 88, 91-92. Petitioners know of no Florida decision which, even by dicta or holding, indicates that a product sold for human consumption which proximately causes the consumer's death can also be deemed "reasonably" fit and wholesome. Rather, the law of Florida provides as stated so clearly again, again, and again in **Cliett vs. Lauderdale-Biltmore Corporation** (Fla. 1949), 39 So.2d 476, 477; and in **Sencer v. Carl's Market** (Fla. 1950), 45 So.2d 671, 672, and in **Haskins v. Jackson Grain Co.** (Fla. 1953), 63 So.2d 514, 515:

> "These cases establish the principle that as to items of food *or other products in the original packages* which are offered for sale *for human consumption or use* generally, a person who purchases such items in reliance upon the express or *implied condition or assurance that they are wholesome and fit for the uses or purposes for which they are advertised or sold*, and *who is injured* as the result of unwholesome or deleterious substances therein which are unknown to the buyer, *may hold either the manufacturer* or the retailer *liable in damages for injuries sustained* by him on the theory of an *implied warranty of unwholesomeness* or fitness of such article or product for the purpose for which it was offered to the public." 39 So.2d at 477; 63 So.2d at 514-515; 45 So.2d at 672. (Italics added)

Conceivably, if a plaintiff brought suit for contracting a postnasal drip from smoking cigarettes, Florida law would permit a jury to find both proximate cause *and* reasonable wholesomeness; but where death itself is the injury proved only a mind trained in the niceties of medieval scholastics can call such a consequence consistent with reasonable wholesomeness.

2. The public policy and law of Florida on the question of whether any standard less than *actual safety for human consumption* is imposed upon a manufacturer of products to be consumed by Florida citizens was certainly settled, if not before, by the Supreme Court of Florida in its advisory opinion in this case:

> "The contention that the wholesomeness of a product should be determined on any standard other than its *actual safety* for human consumption, when supplied for that purpose, is a novel proposition in our law, and one which we are persuaded has no foundation in the decided cases. To hold that prevailing industry standards supplant the ordinary standard of *objective truth and proof*, and should be conclusive on the issue of a product's reasonable fitness for human use or consumption, would be to shift to the purchaser the risk of whatever latent defectiveness may ultimately be proven by experience and advancement of human knowledge, a risk which we are convinced was from the inception of the implied warranty doctrine intended to be attached to the mercantile function. There exists, we think, no real alternative and no valid objection to this distribution of the burden, if the public health

> is to be protected in any practical sense from exploitation by those who, for a profit motive, undertake to supply the vast and ever increasing variety of products which the people by unprecedented powers of commercial persuasion are daily urged to use and consume.
>
> "Accordingly, the question propounded to us, and found by us to be within the contemplation of our Rules, is answered in the affirmative as hereinabove set forth." (Italics added)

Admittedly the public policy of Florida in this regard is not the only possible or reasonable one. Academicians may debate or prefer the law propounded by the Court of Appeals to that expressed by the Florida Supreme Court. See 17 **Vanderbilt Law Review** (December 1963 issue) 315. But at least since **Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins**, supra, the State of Florida, in this area, has a constitutional right to adopt its own policy—one which supplies "the injured person an adequate *and speedy* remedy." **Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co.** (Fla. 1944), 19 So.2d 313, 316. And certainly the Florida law and public policy are a reasonable exercise of that right.[6]

3. In any event, the finding which the Court of

[6] See dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson in *Dalehite v. United States* (1953), 346 U.S. 15, 51: "This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent our population is dependent upon mass producers *** Such a dependent society must exact greater care than in more simple days and must require from manufacturers and producers increased integrity and caution as the only protection of its safety and well-being." The recent experience with thalidomide (a drug which produced incredible malformations in unborn children, the most common deformity being the development of seal-like flippers in place of normal arms and legs) is a striking example.

Appeals concluded is lacking was actually and necessarily made by the jury in this case in its answer to interrogatory number three. The jury there found that the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes was a proximate cause of Green's lung cancer. This finding was based on medical evidence concerning not only Lucky Strike cigarettes but all cigarettes and their effect on people who smoke. As respondent stated in its supplemental brief to the Court of Appeals, p. 11: "The fact is that there is no evidence in the record that Lucky Strike cigarettes are different from any cigarettes with respect to these substances or to any alleged cancer causing properties; and neither plaintiffs nor any of plaintiffs' expert witnesses ever suggested that they were. * * * Not one of plaintiffs' expert witnesses knew anything about the specific properties of Lucky Strike as distinguished from, or in relation to, any other brand of cigarettes. * * * Perforce, if polycyclic hydrocarbons are formed by burning tobacco leaf they are formed when any — not just Lucky Strike — cigarettes are lit."

Nor was there any evidence whatsoever in the record that Green was unique in some way or used the cigarettes abnormally. Under these circumstances, the specific finding of the jury that smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes was a proximate cause of Green's fatal lung cancer necessarily involved a finding that such cigarettes were not reasonably wholesome as to others as well as Green. It was only because others as well as Green had incurred lung cancer from smoking cigarettes that the medical experts could testify concerning the medical cause of Green's case. There was no basis in the record whatsoever for a jury, in finding proximate cause, to find also that Green was the only person who ever got lung cancer from smoking cigarettes.

4. By requiring, as indispensable, a specific finding that others as well as Green have contracted lung cancer from cigarettes, the Court of Appeals does violence to the Florida law that the implied warranty of wholesomeness runs "between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer" — not to the public en masse. **Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corporation** (Fla. 1949), 39 So.2d 476, 477. It is the one "who is injured as the result of unwholesome or deleterious substances therein" who may hold the manufacturer liable. Id. at 477. There is no requirement that only a class suit on behalf of the plaintiff and all others similarly damaged will lie.

Conclusion

Petitioners respectfully submit that the lengthy history of this litigation demonstrates that the ghost of **Swift v. Tyson** (1842), 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865, still stalks the land. When petitioners originally entered the federal forum in 1957 seeking the "speedy remedy" afforded by the law of Florida, they did not anticipate being subjected to repeated visitations by the specter of a dead decision. Petitioners earnestly pray that this Court issue its writ of certiorari to review the judgment and opinion below in order to settle again that there is no transcendental body of federal common law obligatory within a state on persons litigating in federal courts.

Respectfully submitted,

Neal Rutledge
601 Flagler Federal Building
111 N. E. First Street
Miami, Florida 33132

Lawrence V. Hastings
Biscayne Building
Miami, Florida 33132

Counsel for Respondents

Stanley Milledge
Irma Feder

Of Counsel

Certificate of Service

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Cross Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was served by mail this 10th day of April, 1964, upon Edward R. Neaher, Janet C. Brown and Edward C. McLean, Jr., all of Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff, 25 Broadway, New York 4, New York, Counsel for Respondent, and upon Hervey Yancey of Smathers & Thompson, Alfred I. duPont Building, Miami, Florida, counsel for Respondent, by depositing the same in the United States mail addressed to said counsel as aforesaid with sufficient air mail postage, prepaid.

NEAL RUTLEDGE

Neal Rutledge

APPENDIX A

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19003

EDWIN GREEN, JR., as Administrator of the Estate of Edwin Green, Deceased, and MARY GREEN,
Appellants,

versus

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY;
Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

(May 2, 1962)

Before RIVES, CAMERON and BELL, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge: Edwin Green, *Sr.*, brought suit against American Tobacco Company in December 1957, claiming that he had incurred lung cancer as a result of smoking defendant's product, Lucky Strike cigarettes. A few months later, on February 25, 1958, Mr. Green died. Under the Florida Survival Statute,[1] the claim survived, and Mr. Green's son, Edwin Green, Jr., appointed administrator of his estate, was substituted as

---

[1]Section 45.11, Florida Statutes 1959.

plaintiff.[2] The widow, Mary Green, also filed suit under the Florida Wrongful Death Statute.[3] The two suits were consolidated by order of the district court and came on for jury trial upon an amended complaint which asserted in separate counts six theories of liability: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty; (2) Breach of Express Warranty; (3) Negligence; (4) Misrepresentation; (5) Battery; and (6) Violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Florida Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.

As the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, in a ruling not questioned on appeal, the district court sustained the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on all counts except Count 1, breach of implied warranty, and Count 3, negligence. At the close of all the evidence, the defendant renewed its motion for directed verdict on those two counts. The court reserved its ruling on that motion, and submitted the cases to the jury upon the two theories of liability, breach of implied warranty and negligence. The jury returned general verdicts for the defendant, and answered written interrogatories submitted under Rule 49(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:

"(1) Did the decedent Green have primary cancer in his left lung?

"Yes X

"No ____

"If your answer is 'Yes,' then

[2]Rule 25 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[3]Sections 768.01, 768.02, Florida Statutes 1959.

"(2) Was the cancer in his left lung the cause, or one of the causes of his death?

"Yes ___X___

"No _____

"If your answer to the above question is 'Yes,' then

"(3) Was the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent, Green, a proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the development of cancer in his left lung?

"Yes ___X___

"No _____

"If your answer to the above question is 'Yes,' then

"(4) Could the defendant on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight have known that users of Lucky Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent Green, would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?

"Yes _____

"No ___X___"

Upon the jury's verdict, judgment in each case was entered for the defendant. A cost judgment against the plaintiffs was entered in the amount of $1,969.74, which included $900.00 for expert witness fees assessed at the rate of $100.00 each.

Upon appeal, the plaintiffs present no questions as to the rulings on Count 3, negligence, but restrict their contentions to the theory of Count 1, implied warranty. As stated in their brief:

> "Three questions only are presented by these appeals:
>
> "(1) Under the Florida doctrine of implied warranty are not the plaintiffs entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as requested in their post-trial motions under Rule 49(b), based upon the jury's special findings that the smoking of defendant's Lucky Strike cigarettes proximately caused the plaintiffs' decedent to contract a fatal case of cancer of the lung?
>
> "(2) Did not the trial Judge err in refusing to grant plaintiffs' requested charges on the issue of implied warranty and in charging instead that the implied warranty of fitness which a manufacturer under Florida law is held to make depends upon the ability of the manufacturer to know about the harmful substances in its product?
>
> "(3) Did not the trial Judge err in taxing as costs against the plaintiffs a total of nine expert witness fees in the amount of $100.00 per expert, such sums being beyond the amount allowable and authorized by Federal statute?"

Edwin Green, Sr., began smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes in 1924 or 1925 when he was about 16 years old. He smoked from one to three packages per day until early

1956, when his physician advised him that he had contracted cancer of the left lung. By the time of diagnosis the cancer was no longer operable or curable. Ameliorating treatment was given, but the cancer proceeded on its typical, fatal course, and resulted in Mr. Green's death on February 25, 1958.

The testimony at the trial was concerned principally with the issues of whether Mr. Green's death was caused by a cancer originating in the lung, that is, primary lung cancer, and whether that cancer was caused by his smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes. Eight eminent medical doctors testified on each side. They were in sharp disagreement. The district court properly submitted to the jury the questions of medical causation.[4] Their testimony was also in conflict on whether by February 1, 1956, when it was first discovered that Mr. Green had lung cancer, scientific knowledge had progressed to such an extent that the defendant could, by reasonable foresight, have learned that the smoking of cigarettes was a probable cause of lung cancer.

Plaintiff-appellants state their main insistence as follows:

> "The fundamental point upon which the plaintiffs rely on this appeal is that the Trial Court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that the implied warranty of fitness which a manufacturer of products for human consumption is held by Florida law to make does not cover deleterious substances in its products, the harmful effects of

[4] Montgomery v. Stary, Fla. 1955, 84 So. 2d 34, 39; Metzel v. Robinson, Fla. 1958, 102 So. 2d 385, 386; see Great American Indemnity Co. v. Holloway, 5 Cir., 1960, 286 F. 2d 106, 108-109.

which are unknown to the manufacturer and could not have been known by any developed human skill or foresight. Plaintiffs contend that the knowledge of the manufacturer is irrelevant and immaterial to the manufacturer's liability on an implied warranty under Florida law, and that a manufacturer's implied warranty is not limited to harmful substances of which the manufacturer either had knowledge, or should have had knowledge, or could have had knowledge according to developed human skill and foresight."

With that insistence we cannot agree. To the contrary, we are convinced that the doctrine of implied warranty by a manufacturer and seller of the qualities and fitness of the thing sold for the purpose for which it is intended or desired is founded on his superior opportunity to gain knowledge of the product and to form a judgment of its fitness. That principle can clearly be deduced from all of the Florida cases on implied warranty whether by the manufacturer or by the dealer.

In the comparatively early case of *Berger v. E. Berger & Co.*, Fla. 1918, 80 So. 296, a dealer was held liable on an implied warranty that a lot of lumber was fit for the purposes for which the dealer knew that it was purchased. The court quoted at some length a passage from Benjamin on Sales (5th ed.) 595, beginning with the sentence: "An implied warranty, or as it is called, a covenant in law as distinguished from an express contract or express warranty, really is in all cases founded on the presumed intention of the parties and upon reason." 80 So. at 299. The court concluded:

> "We think the rule is well established which embodies the principle above quoted that where a person contracts to supply an article in which he deals for a particular purpose, knowing the purpose for which he supplies it and that the purchaser has no opportunity to inspect the article, but relies upon the judgment of the seller, there is an implied condition or 'warranty,' as it is called, that the article is fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied."

In *Smith v. Burdine's Inc.*, Fla. 1940, 198 So. 223, 227, 229, a buyer requested of a saleslady at a cosmetic counter a good lipstick. The saleslady selected a certain lipstick and recommended it for its intended use. The lipstick contained a poisonous substance which allegedly injured the health of the buyer. In an action for breach of implied warranty of fitness the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that whether the buyer relied on the judgment of the saleslady was for the jury, saying:

> "The existence or non existence of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must and necessarily does depend upon whether or not the buyer relied upon his own judgment at the time of the purchase or relied on the skill or judgment of the seller, and this is a question of fact to be determined by a jury under appropriate instructions." (198 So. 229.)

In *Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co.*, Fla. 1944, 19 So. 2d 313, a manufacturer or canner of a meat product,

known as "Tang," sold to the retailer in sealed packages or cans was held liable to the ultimate consumer for breach of an implied warranty that such product is wholesome and fit for human consumption. The court said in part:

> "The implied warranty theory of liability comports with the general trend of the best reasoned cases. The manufacturer knows the content and quality of the food products canned and offered to the public for consumption. The public generally is vitally concerned in wholesome food, or its health will be jeopardized. If poisonous, unhealthful and deleterious foods are placed by the manufacturer upon the market and injuries occur by the consumption thereof then the law should supply the injured person an adequate and speedy remedy. It is our conclusion that the implied warranty remedy of enforcement will accomplish the desired end." (19 So. 2d at 316.)

In *Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corporation*, Fla. 1949, 39 So. 2d 476, a guest sued the proprietor of a hotel dining room, claiming that he had become ill as the result of eating impure or unwholesome food. The action was based "on the theory of an implied warranty that the food was fit for human consumption." (39 So. 2d 476.) The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. The Florida Supreme Court reversed. In the course of its opinion, it quoted from *Cushing v. Rodman*, 65 App. D. C., 82 F. 2d 864, 868, a passage beginning: "'The basis of implied warranty is justifiable reliance on the judgment or skill of the warrantor . . . .'" Continuing, the Supreme Court of Florida said:

"Indeed, it would seem that if any distinction were to be drawn between the retailer and the restaurant keeper in such a transaction, the duty of the latter should be greater than that of the retailer who in many instances has no better opportunity for knowledge of the fact that certain foods may contain deleterious substances than has the ultimate consumer who purchases the article. For or in a sense the restaurant keeper is the direct manufacturer of the meals he prepares in his own kitchen and serves to his guests in his dining room. It is hardly possible to think of any dishes prepared by him wherein his opportunity for knowledge of the ingredients is not far greater than that of the customer, hence he is in a position largely, if not entirely, denied to the guest to judge of their fitness before he serves them. As between the paying guest, who has no real means of determining whether the meal served is fit for human consumption, and the restaurateur, who is in a position to determine this fact before and during the period of preparation, the burden should properly rest with the one who has or should have such facilities to keep the food pure and fresh as to make an injury to the customer from their use highly improbable if not impossible." (39 So. 2d at 478.)

In *Lambert v. Sistrunk*, Fla. 1952, 58 So. 2d 434, 435, the Florida Supreme Court held that there was no implied warranty arising from statements by defendant's salesmen that a stepladder was strong and would last a lifetime and the plaintiff would never break it. In part the Supreme Court of Florida said:

"It has been said that the concept of implied warranty rests upon the foundation of business ethics and constitutes an exception to the maxim 'let the buyer beware,' itself encompassing the idea that there is no warranty implied with respect to the quality of the goods being sold. To come into play, the exception must therefore spring from some moral obligation on the part of the seller, or perhaps more accurately, on the breach of some such duty amounting to fraud or the taking advantage of the buyer by reason of some superior knowledge in the seller, or the reliance by the buyer on the seller's judgment.

. . . . . .

"There is no need to dwell on the class of cases where the buyer relies upon the seller's judgment of the fitness of a particular article for the purpose intended, because the use of a stepladder is as well known to a buyer as to a seller and is as limited as it is well known. This feature is common to the lipstick involved in Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., supra [Fla. 1940, 198 So. 223]. The difference, as we have already observed, is in the nature of the article sold. One cannot know the ingredients of a lipstick without chemical analysis. One can know as much as a salesman of a stepladder by simply looking at it. And this lack of opportunity to inspect was also a factor in the case of Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra [Fla. 1944, 19 So. 2d 313]."

See also *Florida Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan*, Fla.

1953, 62 So. 2d 910; *Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co.*, Fla. 1953, 63 So. 2d 514; *Food Fair Stores of Florida v. Macardo*, Fla. 1957, 93 So. 2d 860; and *Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd*, Fla. 1958, 101 So. 2d 34.

The appellants rely most strongly upon two very recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of Florida. *Seneer v. Carl's Markets*, Fla. 1950, 45 So. 2d 671, and *Carter v. Hector Supply Co.*, Fla. 1961, 128 So. 2d 390. In *Seneer v. Carl's Markets, supra*, it was held that a retail dealer in food products sold in sealed packages or cans is liable to the consumer on the theory of implied warranty for injuries sustained because of a deleterious, unwholesome or unfit substance for human consumption appearing in the sealed package or can. The trial court had sustained demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, two justices dissenting, two concurring specially, and three concurring in an opinion in effect approving the argument of counsel for appellants stated as follows:

> "Counsel for appellants point out that the duty to offer and sell wholesome food in sealed cans and packages to the consuming public should rest alike on the manufacturer and retailer because the retailer is experienced in buying from the manufacturers; he is acquainted with the products and the manufacturers; he relies upon representations made to him. The public is vitally concerned in wholesome food or its health will be jeopardized and a legal distinction as to liability as between the manufacturer and retailer should not exist." (45 So. 2d 673.)

Justice Hobson concurring specially, in an opinion in which he was joined by Justice Terrell, stated:

> "Furthermore, I am of the opinion that the retailer who is sued and against whom judgment might be secured, should, in turn, be allowed to sue the manufacturer, which is the reason for my disagreement with the views expressed by Associate Justice Tillman. I do not follow his thought that holding a retail grocer liable in a case of this character would result in bankrupting the individual independent grocer. The retail merchant can avoid placing himself in a position wherein he could not, in turn, sue the manufacturer by electing to purchase only from responsible manufacturers within the jurisdiction of the courts in which he might enter suit." (45 So. 2d 673)

Thus, the implied warranty by the retailer was sustained not only because of the retailer's better position in selecting and dealing with the manufacturer, but because the retailer had a right of indemnity over against the manufacturer.

In *Carter v. Hector Supply Co., supra*, the action was by an injured employee of a purchaser of a riding sulky against the retailer. The Florida Supreme Court held that the employee could not impose liability on the retailer on the basis of implied warranty because of absence of privity of contract. That point is not important here because in this litigation no privity defense was raised.

In the course of its opinion, however, the Florida Supreme Court did say that the employee "relied entirely on

an alleged implied warranty in order to impose absolute liability regardless of fault on the retailer with relation to whom there was no privity." Further in the course of its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the holding of the District Court of Appeal (122 So. 2d 22) to the effect that proof of actual or implied knowledge of the defect on the part of the retailer is essential to his liability on an implied warranty. The Supreme Court of Florida said:

> "The ultimate holding of the court of appeal is to the effect that proof of actual or implied knowledge of a defect on the part of a retailer is essential to his liability on an implied warranty in an action brought by one other than the purchaser. The court of appeal relied upon Lambert v. Sistrunk, Fla. 1952, 58 So. 2d 434. Here again we think its confidence was misplaced for the simple reason that Lambert involved a direct purchaser-seller situation in which the purchaser had an opportunity equal to that of the seller to inspect the item purchased. It did not involve a third party effort to impose implied warranty responsibility on a retailer.
>
> "The instant holding of the court of appeal, however, is essentially correct in finding that a retailer could be held liable to a third party in a *negligence action* as contrasted to absolute liability under an *implied warranty* only if the retailer could be charged with actual or implied knowledge of the defect. Again we emphasize that in the case at bar Carter relied entirely on an al-

leged implied warranty in order to impose absolute liability regardless of fault on the retailer with relation to whom there was no privity. Finding as we do that the lack of privity between these parties precluded the implication of a warranty, the plaintiff would necessarily be relegated to an action in tort for negligence. Actually this, in effect, is where the ultimate judgment of the court of appeal placed him. In that event, in the type of situation immediately before us, it would be necessary for him to prove that the retailer knew, or should have known, of the defective condition of the commodity. To this extent the court of appeal ruled correctly in holding that proof of this element would support a finding of fault on the part of the retailer. This is in direct contrast with the rule that such proof is wholly unnecessary in an implied warranty situation." (128 So. 2d 392.)

The actual holding of the court was thus expressed:

"The sum of our holding here simply is that one who is not in privity with a retailer has no action against him for breach of an implied warranty, except in situations involving foodstuffs or perhaps dangerous instrumentalities, a problem not presently here." (128 So. 2d 393.)

If the language in *Carter v. Hector Supply Co., supra*, relied on by appellants, is anything more than dictum, it does not go so far as to sustain the appellants' position in the present case. It does not say that it is immaterial that the manufacturer could not have known, or had no oppor-

tunity to gain knowledge, or to form a judgment as to the dangerous qualities of the product manufactured and sold.

We think, therefore, that the jury's general verdicts for the defendant are sustained by its negative answer to special interrogatory No. 4.

> "No. 4. Could the defendant on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight have known that users of Lucky Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent Green, would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?"

The defendant could not be held liable as an absolute insurer against consequences of which no developed human skill and foresight could afford knowledge. The district court did not err in charging the jury that,

> ". . . . The manufacturer of products which are offered for sale to the public in their original package for human consumption or use impliedly warrants that its products are reasonably wholesome or fit for the purpose for which they are sold, but such implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured product, the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or foresight can afford knowledge."

Founded on the presumed intention of the parties and upon reason is the doctrine that the existence or nonexistence of an implied warranty of fitness for a particu-

lar purpose depends upon whether or not the buyer, at the time of the purchase, relies on the skill and judgment of the seller. The buyer is presumed so to rely only when the seller is thought to have a superior opportunity to exercise such skill, or to gain knowledge of the product or of its source, and hence to form a better judgment of its fitness. The common sense of that doctrine may be appreciated by foreseeing its probable application to three different classes of products intended for human consumption: (1) those believed by all to be wholesome, for example, most foods; (2) those known by all to be injurious to some while perhaps beneficial or pleasurable to others, for example, alcoholic beverages; (3) those heretofore thought by all to be wholesome or tolerable, but which constantly expanding scientific research, thought and knowledge have now proved, or at least convinced many, to be injurious, such as cigarettes in the smoke of which appear polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and minute quantities of arsenic, and eggs, milk and butter with their high cholesterol content—and what the future may develop the most vivid imagination cannot foretell. Applying that doctrine, as we have stated it, to (1), no absolute liability is imposed upon the seller unless the product contains some foreign substance, is spoiled, or differs in some way from the product it is represented to be. As to (2), the same exceptions obtain; otherwise, the buyer knows as much about the article as the seller, and relies upon his own judgment rather than that of the seller. As to (3), that doctrine leaves as a question of fact to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions whether the seller, in the estimation of the parties, had a superior opportunity to gain knowledge of the product or its source, and, hence, whether the buyer, at the time of purchase, relied on the judgment of the seller.

It is that doctrine, thus founded upon reason and on the presumed intention of the parties, which, we think, is clearly to be deduced from all of the Florida cases.

Under the present statute, 28 U.S.C.A. §1821, the district court had no authority to tax costs for compensation to an expert witness in excess of the statutory attendance per day, mileage and subsistence allowance.[5] The cost judgment is therefore reversed for entry by the district court of a judgment in accordance with this opinion. The judgments for the defendants are affirmed. Costs of appeal are taxed against the appellants.

CAMERON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

The jury in this case found that Edwin Green, Sr., age 49, died of primary cancer of the lung, which was proximately contributed to by his smoking of Lucky Strike Cigarettes, produced for human consumption by appellee American Tobacco Company.[1] Having thus found, the jury rejected the appellants' claim for Green's death, because the trial court required that they must find that the injurious substance so established to have been in the cigar-

[5] Henkel v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 1932, 284 U. S. 444; Department of Highways v. McWilliams Dredging Co., W. D. La., 1950, 10 F. R. D. 107, aff'd 5 Cir., 1951, 187 F. 2d 61; Cheatham Electric S. D. Co. v. Transit Development Co., 2 Cir., 1919, 261 Fed. 792, 796; Firtag v. Gendleman, Dist. Ct. D. C., 1957, 152 F. Supp. 226; Commerce Oil Refining Corporation v. Miner, Dist. Ct. R. I., 198 F. Supp. 895, 897-898. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.77 (5), p. 1367.

[1] It is not contended that there was lack of privity between American and Green.

ettes and its harmful effects would have been revealed to American "by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight." This limitation on the jury was in effect the equivalent of a charge that the exercise of reasonable care on the part of American would exonerate it from liability. I think the charge was clearly erroneous.

This appeal is predicated solely on the theory that American breached its implied warranty to Green. I do not think that one who warrants wholesomeness can escape liability by showing that it exercised reasonable care in its efforts to achieve it. Such an idea is, in my opinion, a refutation of the whole concept of warranty. Because I do not believe that the inclusion of this limitation upon American's duty under implied warranty was justified, I am unable to join in the majority opinion affirming the action of the court below.

This court recently[2] delineated the general nature of implied warranty:

> "For the purpose of this appeal, the defendants apparently concede that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings of the jury that the plaintiff ingested the crab shell at Arnaud's and that it caused his injury. In our view there was ample evidence before the jury to justify these findings. It is contended, however, that the court *erred in trying the case on the theory of implied warranty* and in holding that plaintiff was not required to

[2]Arpaud's Restaurant, Inc. et al v. Cotter, 1954, 212 F. 2d 883, certiorari denied, 348 U. S. 915.

prove that Arnaud's was guilty of negligence, either actually or by the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. [P. 885] . . . .

"The primary question for determination is whether under the decisions and law of Louisiana the proprietor of a public eating place *who serves a food fabricated* by him and containing a foreign substance . . . *is under an absolute liability for damages* proximately resulting from the impurity under the theory of *an implied warranty of fitness.* Our review of the authorities convinces us that such is the law of Louisiana. Consequently, the trial court correctly enforced and applied this principle in the trial of the present case.

"This rule of liability was first announced in Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906, 907, 40 L.R.A., N.S. 480, where the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the seller of food at a public eating place is *conclusively presumed to know any unwholesome condition of the food and is answerable in damages to a purchaser who is made ill because of the unwholesomeness.* The basis of this holding was said to be that:

> ". . . every one ought to know the qualities, good or bad, of the things which he fabricates in the exercise of the art, craft, or business of which he makes public profession, and that *lack of such knowledge is imputed to him as a fault*, which makes him liable to the purchasers of his fabri-

> cations for the damage resulting from the vices or defects thereof which he did not make known to them and which they were ignorant of.'
>
> . . .
>
> "While the Court was there [LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 So. 2d 873] dealing with a manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by the consumption of deleterious ingredients contained in a bottled beverage, it carefully pointed out that under Louisiana jurisprudence *a plaintiff in such a case is entitled to rely upon the manufacturer's implied warranty that its product is safe for human consumption.* [Emphasis supplied.]

While we were dealing in Arnaud's case with the presence of a foreign object, that was not the determinant fact; we placed great reliance upon and quoted from the *Doyle* case from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, where the consumer had been made sick by eating food purchased from the seller with respect to which the seller made uncontradicted proof of the exercise of the highest degree of care in its preparation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the seller was "at fault if these articles proved to be vitiated and deleterious."

The law there applied was the law of Louisiana, while here we are sitting as a Florida court and applying Florida's law. The quoted language is of some importance for

the reason that the Supreme Court of Florida, in a case[3] which it described as presenting a question of first impression, referred to the *Doyle* case, supra, as one of the authorities it relied upon in fashioning the Florida rule governing the doctrine of implied warranty. In *Cliett* the Florida court stated:

> "The sole question for determination on the pleading is *whether the proprietor of a public restaurant or dining room who serves a meal containing unwholesome food* to a paying guest for immediate consumption on the premises *is under an absolute liability for the damages proximately resulting from the impurities, on the theory of an implied warranty* of fitness . . .
>
> "Some courts have held that in the absence of statute a victualer serving food for immediate consumption on the premises may not be held liable for food deleterious to health, without proof that he was guilty of negligence; while others have determined that aside from any question of negligence such a purveyor of foods for a valuable consideration *is under an absolute liability for unwholesome food served by him, on the theory of an implied warranty of fitness.* . . .
>
> "In our opinion the implied warranty theory of liability comports with the general trend of the better reasoned cases and is supported, on principle at least, by decisions from our own jurisdiction . . .

[3]Cliett v. Lauderdale-Biltmore Corp., 1949, 39 So. 2d 476, 477.

"These cases establish the principle that as to items of *food or other products* in the original package which are offered for sale for human *consumption or use generally*, a person who purchases such items in reliance upon the express or implied condition or assurance that they are wholesome and fit for the uses or purposes for which they are advertised or sold, and who is injured as the result of *unwholesome or deleterious substances* therein which are unknown to the buyer, may hold either the manufacturer or the retailer liable in damages for injuries sustained by him, on the theory of an *implied warranty of wholesomeness or fitness* of such article or product for the purposes for which it was offered to the public." [Emphasis added.]

In *Sencer et al v. Carl's Markets, Inc.*, 1950, 45 So. 2d 671, the Florida Supreme Court, en banc, was considering the claim against the dealer, not the manufacturer, of persons made sick by eating sardines from a can from which they were served to the consumers. It held that both the manufacturer and the dealer were liable if unwholesome food were offered to the consuming public, quoting from Vol. 1, Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed., page 635:

"'*The imposition of absolute liability* upon a dealer who sells canned goods of reputable manufacture has been denied in a few decisions on the ground that the seller cannot possibly discover that a particular can is defective, and that it is, therefore, unjust to subject him to liability. The same argument, however, may be made in regard

to any implied warranty, not only of food *or other articles, where* the buyer must have been aware that the seller could *not discover a defect if it existed.* Accordingly, if canned goods are to be made an exception to the general rule governing sales of food, the whole law of implied warranty should be revised and placed on another basis.

"'But the general principle of the common law is opposed to this, and certainly if a dealer is ever to be made liable for injuries caused by defective goods *where he has been guilty of no fault*, the reasons are stronger for holding him liable for selling defective food than in any other kind of sale. And by the weight of authority, presumably for these reasons, a dealer is liable for selling such food even though in sealed containers of a reputable brand.'"[4]

In *Miami Coca Cola Bottling Company, Inc. v. Todd*, 1958, 101 So. 2d 34, the Florida court recognized the rule of the above cases in this comment:

"The bottler recognizes that Florida law places bottlers of cold drinks under the same rule of absolute liability of implied warranty as canners

[4]The majority opinion takes note of the fact that two Justices concurred specially and two Justices dissented. None of them, however, differed with the majority in holding that the duty of the manufacturer was absolute. Judges Terrell and Hobson merely emphasized that they were in favor of holding the retail grocer, because otherwise the consumer in many cases could not reach the manufacturer. The dissenting Justices were in favor of holding the manufacturer, but not the dealer, to the same absolute liability the majority had declared to be the rule in Florida.

of food. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Jordan, Fla. 1953, 62 So. 2d 910."

In extending the implied warranty rule to a seller of seed, the Supreme Court of Florida, en banc,[5] recognized the continuing validity and vitality of the foregoing rules in these words:

"The general rule that an ultimate purchaser may not sue the wholesaler is not an absolute one and it seems to be losing force with the passage of time. For instance, this court has recognized the principle 'that *as to items of foods or other products* in the original package which are offered for sale for human consumption *or use generally*, a person who purchases such items in reliance upon the express or *implied condition or assurance that they are wholesome and fit* for the uses or purposes for which they are advertised or sold, and *who is injured as the result of unwholesome or deleterious substances therein* which are unknown to the buyer, may hold either the manufacturer or the retailer liable . . .'

"There is a conflict of opinion about the accountability of a manufacturer to a consumer on the theory of implied warranty in the absence of privity, but this court has become aligned with those courts holding that suit may be brought against the manufacturer notwithstanding want of privity . . ." [Emphasis added.]

[5]Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 1953, 63 So. 2d 514.

The question of whether the rule of implied warranty in products cases arose from contract or from tort was settled by the Supreme Court of Florida in *Carter v. Hector Supply Co.*, 1961, 128 So. 2d 390, 391: "Perhaps in its judicial incipiency the rule of liability on implied warranty was grounded in some measure on the law covering deceit and therefore assumed the complexion of a tort action. However, it is now generally agreed that the implication of a warranty arises out of a contractual relationship . . ." That case involved an effort by a purchaser to apply the implied warranty rule against a seller with whom he was not in privity the subject of the sale not being for human use. In rejecting the application of the implied warranty rule in such a case, the court (p. 392) used language indicating clearly that, in products for human use cases where privity always exists, the implied warranty of the seller is absolute:

> "Again we emphasize that in the case at bar Carter relied entirely on an alleged implied warranty in order to *impose absolute liability regardless of fault* on the retailer with relation to whom there was no privity. Finding as we do that the lack of privity between these parties precluded the implication of a warranty, the plaintiff would necessarily be relegated to an action in tort for negligence. Actually this, in effect, is where the ultimate judgment of the court of appeal placed him. In that event, in the type of situation immediately before us, it would be necessary for him to prove that the retailer *knew, or should have known*, of the defective condition of the commodity. To this extent the court of appeal ruled cor-

rectly in holding that proof of this element would support a finding of fault on the part of the retailer. This is in direct contrast with the rule that *such proof is wholly unnecessary in an implied warranty situation . . .*" [Emphasis added.][6]

A reading of these cases and authorities demonstrates to me clearly that Question 4 as framed was effective in presenting to the jury only the claim that Green's death resulted from American's negligence and that it ignored entirely the liberal Florida rule based upon implied warranty, which was covered by another count in the complaint. To establish their claim based upon negligence it was admittedly incumbent upon appellants to prove that American knew, or by the exercise of proper care—probably more than reasonable care—could have known, that the nicotine[7] and arsenic present in the smoke from Lucky Strikes were likely to do harm to the decedent. The count based on negligence was submitted to the jury, which found in favor of American and no appeal was taken from that portion of the verdict. But the duty of the appellants to prove that American could, by the reasonable application

[6]From these cases it is plain that Florida is in the vanguard of those states, as yet numerically in the minority, which are holding purveyors of food and other products for human consumption to an absolute liability under the doctrine of implied warranty. The cases on the subject are legion and are collected in annotations found in 74 A. L. R. 2d 1111, *et seq.*, 75 A. L. R. 2d 39, et seq. and 44, et seq., and 77 A. L. R. 2d, pp. 61, et seq., 66, et seq. and 122, et seq. And see "Implied Warranty in Florida," 12 U. of Fla. Law Review, 241, 245-246; Prosser, "The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)," 69 Yale Law Journal 1099, and Frumer and Friedman, "Products Liability" (1960), pp. 1-8.

[7]Defined in Webster's New World Dictionary, College Edition, p. 991, as ". . . a poisonous alkaloid . . . found in tobacco leaves, from which it is extracted as a colorless, oily, acrid, transparent liquid . . ."

of human skill and foresight, anticipate that Lucky Strikes would endanger decedent's health was not, under Florida law, a part of an action based upon implied warranty.

Every warranty is a promise by him who makes it, a contract, a stipulation, an assurance that the subject of the warranty will be performed or that the warrantor will make good the loss arising from its breach. Under Florida's law, the implied warranty was an unconditional guarantee to Green that the use to which the cigarettes would be put, as understood by all, would not do him harm by reason of any deleterious substance or ingredient contained in them.

I think the Florida cases establish a rule of law which constitutes a condition of every sale of a product for human consumption or use, which has the same legal effect in this case as if appellee had entered into a written contract with decedent, covering every package of cigarettes purchased by him, couched in these words:

> American guarantees that the cigarettes contained in this package are fit to be used by purchaser, a human being, by lighting and drawing smoke from them into the lungs, so that the ingredients of the cigarettes carried in the smoke may be deposited on the walls of the blood vessels situated therein, to the end that said ingredients will be absorbed into the blood stream and will produce in the smoker the soothing and relaxing sensations normally attending such use; that said cigarettes do not contain any harmful or deleterious substance; and that it will indemnify the

user against any injury, loss or damage which may result from the smoking of said cigarettes.

II.

As I understand the majority opinion, the effort is made to distinguish the Florida cases from the one before us chiefly on the ground that the decided cases deal with situations where some foreign object or substance was at the root of the injury caused the user. I understand further that the majority thinks that the fact that the Florida Court has, in several of the cases, adverted to the ease with which a manufacturer could determine the presence *vel non* of deleterious substances, as compared with the opportunity given the purchaser to gain such knowledge, demonstrates that the Florida Court intended to make proof of foreseeability of harm by the exercise of reasonable care a *sine qua non* of recovery under the implied warranty rule. I am not able to agree with the majority on either score, and I think the italicized passages quoted from the Florida decisions, supra, demonstrate the error into which, in my opinion, the majority has fallen. A brief resume of the cases will be helpful.

In *Arnaud's* the presence of a piece of shell which should not have been in the dish served to the customer was mentioned, but what we stressed in that opinion was that the food *was in fact unwholesome when served.* It is clear from our opinion that the unwholesomeness alone fastened liability, the holding being that the seller was conclusively presumed to know of the existence of any unwholesome condition regardless of its cause, and that lack of knowledge is implied to him as a fault. This is

plain from the language of the opinion, as well as the further holding that the implied warranty is that the product is *safe* for human consumption or use.

The Florida Court, in *Cliett*, held without equivocation that the seller is under an absolute liability if he serves unwholesome or impure foods regardless of their character or source. It emphasized too that the warranty applied to products for human use generally — not only food.

Sencer was decided on the allegations of the complaint. A storekeeper had served a can of sardines which, when eaten, produced sickness. The complaint alleged, alternatively, that the sardines "contained foreign or dangerous matter deleterious within itself." The court did not reject the complaint on the ground that it did not allege that the sardines contained some foreign matter, specified or otherwise. It was enough that *whatever the can of sardines contained was deleterious within itself.* That was held sufficient by the Supreme Court of Florida. As to the matter of knowledge of what was in the can of sardines or ability to acquire such knowledge, the storekeeper of course was wholly without any means of obtaining knowledge — yet absolute liability was fastened upon him.

In *Hoskins* neither knowledge nor the presence of a specified foreign substance was mentioned. The opinion holds simply and clearly that there is absolute liability where products in the original package are sold for human use or consumption and that injury results by reason of the presence of some unwholesome or deleterious substance.

The Florida Court in *Carter* emphasized again that,

where products were sold for human consumption, proof that the seller knew or ought to have known of the unwholesome condition was "wholly unnecessary."

I am unable to read into the Florida decisions the ideas which the majority advances as the basis for its failure to follow what seem to me to be the clear and unequivocal holdings of the cases discussed. It is true that the court adverts, more than once in these cases, to the plain fact that the manufacturer or seller was in much better position to acquire knowledge of the nature and characteristics of the ingredients of the thing sold than the purchaser for use. These discussions, it seems to me, were in justification of its determination to apply the stringent implied warranty doctrine to this limited field of sales contracts instead of imposing on the purchaser the difficult task of proving negligence. There is, as I see it, no indication that the court was intending to water down the absolute obligations of a contract of implied warranty to the level of proof governing tort actions.

It is significant also that American does not rely on a single Florida case to support its position. It is content to rely on the contention that, granted that Green died because he smoked Lucky Strike cigarettes, the maker of them should not be held liable for his death unless the jury could find from the evidence that it could, in the exercise of reasonable care, have known that the deleterious substances in Lucky Strike cigarettes would do him harm. Little good will be done by discussing the cases from other states which do not follow the rule embraced by the Florida Court with respect to implied warranty as governing such sales. Since American prints, as an appendix to

one of its briefs, the entire opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in *Otto E. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.*, 1961, now reported in 295 F. 2d 292, I will comment on the holdings of that case which, it seems to me, contains more which is favorable to the Greens than to American.

In his action for damages based upon the claim that he had contracted lung cancer from smoking Chesterfield cigarettes between 1921 and the time his lung was removed in 1953, Pritchard based his claim of liability upon implied warranty of merchantability and negligence. The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the action founded upon breach of warranty, and granted the Tobacco Company's motion for directed verdict as to plaintiff's charges of negligence. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed both rulings. Since Pritchard's action was predicated upon Pennsylvania's Uniform Sales Act, which establishes quite different bases of liability, including the element of knowledge, from the common law of Florida as recognized by its court decisions, very little can be gained by discussion of this phase of the decision. It is sufficient to observe that the Court thought that the evidence adduced to the trial court was sufficient to support a case based upon Pennsylvania's restricted rule of implied warranty or upon negligence, and indicating even that it was sufficient to sustain a claim based upon express warranty.

III.

In *Pritchard* the plaintiff offered evidence, held inadmissible for insufficient proof, of the existence of 795

articles allegedly dealing with the harmful effect of tobacco upon the human body. Certainly such evidence, coupled with that in the record before us and information possessed by everyone,[8] make it certain that we are dealing with a situation of recognized seriousness.

IV.

An illuminating dissertation on "Implied Warranty in Fiorida" appears in the University of Florida Law Review, Fall 1959, Vol. XII, No. 3, pp. 241, et seq.[9] A quotation from two of its paragraphs will be found interesting:

> "The subject of products liability is probably the most rapidly expanding area of substantive law at the present time. There are at least three reasons for this: . . . . Moreover, goods are frequently packaged in sealed containers, and often the purchaser does not have the ability, the opportunity, or the desire to make an inspection of the articles purchased. Third, the masterful and realistic logic of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the famous MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. case (111 N.E. 1050) in the year 1916 has given to courts

[8] In the issue of Newsweek Magazine of March 19, 1962 is an article headed "On the Line Again," which describes a report just made by the Royal College of Physicians in London bearing the title "Smoking and Health." It is stated that the Society issued an unequivocal indictment of cigarettes. The statistics included in the report are anything but reassuring in connection with tobacco and lung cancer, coronary heart disease, and gastric ulcers. And the public press of April 7, 1962 carries a U. P. I. release which states: "The Italian parliament has passed a bill outlawing advertising for cigarets and other tobacco products."

[9] While a good number of the cases discussed in this dissent and in the majority opinion are analyzed in the article, its main conclusions are inapplicable to the problem before us inasmuch as it states, "The survey, however, will be confined to the questions of defects in the articles sold . . ."

and counsel strong impetus, and in some cases perhaps the necessary courage to re-examine previous decisions on the subject [Page 241] . . .

"By way of summary, it will be seen that although the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. has been responsible for a great and beneficial change in the law relating to products liability, there is still a great deal of confusion in a majority of the states and glaring contrast among the comparatively few settled principles as they are applied in the various jurisdictions. Happily, Florida has gone to the forefront of the states that have resolved the questions involved in this area in a logical and just manner . . ." [Pages 247-248]

Before summarizing briefly the points of difference between the majority and myself, I quote a rule which the authors of the Law Journal article distilled from two of the Florida cases which the majority and I have adverted to (Pages 253-254).

"Five years after the Blanton case, Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp. nailed down the liability in food cases.

"Rule XI. *A seller of food for value to immediate consumers is absolutely liable for injuries as a result of unwholesomeness of the food on the implied warranty of fitness for human consumption regardless of negligence, the basis being the*

reliance of the consumer on the seller's skill and judgment." [Emphasis in the original.]

I understand to be basic in the rule of implied warranty of fitness announced by the majority "whether or not the buyer, at the time of the purchase, relies on the skill and judgment of the seller." There is no dispute on this question here. Green, before his death, testified that he bought Lucky Strike cigarettes in sealed packages from the grocery store just as he bought many items of food packaged by reputable manufacturers; that he had no notice that, and made no investigation to determine whether, harmful ingredients were present and that he had never had a cigarette subjected to chemical analysis and had never had an occasion to do so. He stopped using them when he was advised that he had contracted lung cancer.

The majority treats cigarettes in the original package as belonging in the category of foods as respects application of the doctrine of implied warranty.[10] But it segregates "products intended for human consumption" into three different classes." In class one, it places most foods; in class two, it places alcoholic beverages; and class three includes cigarettes. The basis for this classification I have been wholly unable to find. Certainly, as I understand them, the Florida cases do not give any hint of such a classification

[10] There would seem to be no question as to this since the cases beginning with the *Chett* case, referred to "*foods or other products*" and added the words "use generally" as an alternative for the words "human consumption". As is pointed out above, the "consumption" of a portion of the smoke coming from Lucky Strike cigarettes is as real as the "consumption" of a portion of any item of food introduced into the human system through the alimentary canal

Strangely enough, the majority holds that no absolute liability is imposed upon the seller of foods "believed by all to be wholesome." Liability as to food, according to its thinking, exists only where the food contains some foreign substance, is spoiled, or differs in some way from the product it is represented to be. If the majority is correct in this, the writings of the Florida courts have, in my opinion, been in vain and the law of implied contracts governing sales of food is the same that it was before Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote the *MacPherson* opinion and the Florida Supreme Court decided the *Cliett case*.[11]

Nor do I find any statement in any Florida case which justifies the discrimination which the majority opinion makes in favor of purveyors of such articles as cigarettes. Finally, as I read them, the Florida cases do not justify the

[11] Sight seems to have been lost of the actions of the court below which are brought before us for review. The appellants filed in writing requests that the court spell out for the jury the Florida law of implied contracts as established with respect to products for human consumption. These several instructions refused by the court below incorporated principles taken directly from decided cases. Illustrative of them is Instruction No. 22 reading as follows:

Implied Warranty

"The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that the principle 'that as to items of food or other products in the original package which are offered for sale for human consumption or use generally, a person who purchases such items in reliance upon the express or implied condition or assurance that they are wholesome or fit for the uses or purposes for which they are advertised or sold, and who is injured as the result of unwholesome or deleterious substances therein which are unknown to the buyer, may hold either the manufacturer or the retailer liable.'"

Cited as support for this requested instruction were the *Hoskins* and *Cliett* cases, supra.

A long discussion was had between the lawyers and the court concerning the requested instructions. The court stated that an exception would be allowed with respect to each instruction which was marked refused and that it would not be necessary for the plaintiffs to take any further exception.

charge quoted in the majority opinion excepting the manufacturer from the absolute liability imposed upon it if the jury should find that the reasonable application of human skill and foresight would not reveal the harmful ingredients which the jury had found the accused cigarettes contained.

For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX B

Received June 22, 1962.

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For The Fifth Circuit

No. 19003

EDWIN GREEN, JR., as Administrator of the Estate of Edwin Green, Deceased, and MARY GREEN,

Appellants,

versus

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY

Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

(June 20, 1962)

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before RIVES, CAMERON and BELL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: So far as concerns this case, the following facts are established by the jury's answers to interrogatories under Rule 49 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) The decendent Green had primary cancer in his left lung; (2) the cancer in his left lung was the cause or one of the causes of his death; (3) the smoking

of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent, Green, was a proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the development of cancer in his left lung; (4) American Tobacco Company could not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of Lucky Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent, Green, would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung.

Those interrogatories were propounded and answered upon the assumption of certain facts which appear without dispute, such as: (a) At all pertinent times American Tobacco Company has been and still is the manufacturer and distributor of Lucky Strike cigarettes; (b) by February 1, 1956, the primary cancer in the left lung of decedent Green had been definitely diagnosed. He died on February 25, 1958.

In this diversity action, Florida law governs the rights and liabilities of the parties. Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung? There is no Florida decision precisely in point and so

clearly on all fours to be dispositive of this question or proposition of law.

In view of the importance of the question, and in especial consideration of the fact that one of the Judges of this Court dissented from this Court's disposition of that question on original hearing, and that the Judges of this Court, on petition for rehearing, remain of the same views as expressed in their opinions on original hearing, this Court has decided to grant the petition for rehearing to the extent necessary to certify such question or proposition of the laws of Florida to the Supreme Court of Florida, as provided for under Section 25.031 Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., as implemented by Rule 4.61 of the Florida Appellate Rules (*In re Florida Appellate Rules*, 127 So. 2d 444, March 1, 1961). See *Clay v. Sun Insurance Office*, 1960, 363 U. S. 207, 212; *Sun Insurance Office v. Clay*, 133 So. 2d 735.

The parties are requested to stipulate, if possible, the contents of the certificate as provided for in said rule. If they are unable so to stipulate, they should report to this Court their respective views on or before August 1, 1962.[1]

To such extent the petition for rehearing is

GRANTED.

[1]Such report may be typed, and accompanied by brief which may be either typed or printed, at least four legible copies to be filed.

APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, JANUARY TERM, A. D. 1963. CASE NO. 31,960 (TWO APPEALS CONSOLIDATED)

EDWIN GREEN, JR., as Administrator of the Estate of Edwin Green Deceased, and MARY GREEN,

Appellants.

vs.

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,

Appellee.

Opinion filed June 5, 1963

On certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Neal Rutledge, Milledge, Rutledge & Milledge; Lawrence V. Hastings and Irma Feder, for Appellants

Hervey Yancey, Samuel A. Broadnax, Jr., Smathers & Thompson, Ralph D. Ray, Melvin D. Goodman and Janet C. Brown, for Appellee

DREW, J.

Pursuant to statutory certification procedure[1] the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has presented to this Court a question concerning implied

[1] Sec. 25.031, F.S.; F.A.R. 4.61. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Cl[illegible], Fla. 1961, 133 So. 2d 735. See also 24 F.R.D. 490; 16 Miami L.Q. 125; 55 N.W. L. 422; 40 Texas L.R. 621.

warranty liability for lack of merchantability or fitness under Florida law, arising in an action for wrongful death consolidated with a suit instituted by the decedent Green prior to his death from lung cancer in 1958. The trial of cause resulted in a general verdict for defendant, and the jury also answered a number of special interrogatories hereinafter detailed. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting, but in recognition of the controlling effect of Florida law in a diversity action a petition for rehearing was granted "to the extent necessary to certify [the following] question or proposition" of the laws of Florida" to this Court:

> "Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?"

We note at the outset that all questions of causation and privity are foreclosed by the terms of the question certified, which expressly assumes, as found by the jury's response to interrogatories in the trial of the cause, that defendant's cigarettes caused plaintiff's fatal cancer. We conclude also that the question thus framed does not pre-

sent for our consideration the issue of whether the cigarettes which caused a cancer in this particular instance were as a matter of law unmerchantable[2] in Florida under the stated conditions, nor does it request a statement of the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of this case. The inquiry before us is, instead, limited to the status of Florida law upon imposition of liability "as for breach of implied warranty" when the manufacturer or warrantor "could not, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known of the danger."[2(a)] By response to a specific interrogatory the jury in this case found that the defendant, by this standard, could not at the pertinent time have known of the danger involved. The general verdict for defendant was responsive to the trial court's instruction that "implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured product the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or foresight can afford knowledge."

Upon the critical point, our decisions conclusively establish the principle that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty, and the question certified must therefore be answered in the affirmative. As already indicated, we do not feel that the inquiry in terms either requests a response on the ultimate issue of liability in this case or requires any comment on the disposition of issues between the court and

---

2Cf. Food Fair Stores of Florida v. Macurda, Fla. 1957, 93 So. 2d 860, cited in Frumer and Friedman, *Products* Liability, Sec. 25, and see also Sec. 29.03[1] on the problem of individual reactions to ordinarily harmless substances, discussion of which we deem unwarranted here because of the lack of Florida precedent and the limited issue posed in this nonadversary proceeding.

2(a) While not involved in the question before us, we note that the defense of assumption of risk is not asserted or involved in these proceedings.

jury under the law relating to scope and breach of the implied warranty that a product supplied for human consumption shall be reasonably fit and wholesome for that general purpose.

Our conclusion on the point presented rests not only upon a determination, acknowledged in the opinion of the Court of Appeals herein, that there is no direct and affirmative precedent in our law for the "human skill and foresight" limitation on warranty liability, but also upon what seem to us clear and definitive pronouncements in our case law negativing this limitation. One of the more recent and exhaustive opinions is that in Carter v. Hector Supply Co.[3] This Court in that case expressly overruled the holding of the court of appeal "that proof of actual or implied knowledge of a defect on the part of a [defendant] is essential to his liability on an implied warranty."[4] "Implied knowledge" refers clearly to the situation where a defendant could, with reasonable diligence or "application of human skill and foresight," have had knowledge. The decision in Carter on this point of law therefore effectively negates any idea that proof of lack of opportunity for knowledge of a harmful condition might prevent implied warranty liability.

No reasonable distinction can, in our opinion, be made between the physical or practical impossibility of obtaining knowledge of a dangerous condition, and scientific inability resulting from a current lack of human knowledge and skill. Sencer v. Carl's Markets[5] imposed upon a dealer liability for sale of a can of sardines which he could not have known was dangerous without opening

3Fla. 1961, 128 So. 2d 390.
4Ibid. p. 392.
5Fla. 1950, 45 So. 2d 671.

a sealed container and thereby destroying the product's salability. The opinion quotes with approval from text authorities[6] explaining the prevailing rule that the fact that a defect could not possibly have been known or discovered by a defendant does not prevent liability, because "the same argument . . . may be made in regard to any implied warranty, not only of food . . . where the buyer must have been aware that the seller could not discover a defect if it existed." This case illustrates, we think, that whatever may be the scope of an implied warranty in a given case, the basis of such liability is the undertaking or agreement, attributed by law, to be responsible in the event the thing sold is not in fact merchantable or fit for its ordinary use or purposes. The assumption of responsibility, even implied assumption, is not, of course, necessarily co-equivalent with skill and knowledge. To the extent that our cases take note of a defendant's opportunity for knowledge, it is merely in recognition of a supplier's superior position, relative to the purchasing public, as a factor affecting policy considerations rather than determining the limits of implied warranty liability in a particular situation.

The Florida decisions[8] recognize a distinction between the ordinary merchantability warranty involved in

---

[6] Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed., Vol. 1, p. 635.

[7] Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313, 316: "The implied waranty theory of liability comports with the general trend of the best reasoned cases. The manufacturer knows the content and quality of the food products canned and offered to the public for consumption. The public generally is vitally concerned in wholesome food, or its health will be jeopardized. If pois nous, unhealthful and deleterious foods are placed by the manufacturer upon the market and injuries occur by the consumption thereof then the law should supply the injured person an adequate and speedy remedy. It is our conclusion that the implied warranty remedy of enforcement will accomplish the desired end." See also Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., Fla. 1949, 39 So. 2d 476.

[8] Berger v. E. Berger, 76 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296; Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223, 229.

the instant case and a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose which "must and necessarily does depend upon whether or not the buyer relied upon his own judgment at the time of the purchase or relied on the skill or judgment of the seller." The opinions refer to the classical statement of implied warranty law in Benjamin on Sales,[9] containing a full discussion of the derivation of these principles governing implied warranties in the common law. The decision in Lambert v. Sistrunk,[10] denying a merchant's liability for sale of a defective stepladder, is an application of one of the limiting principles discussed by Benjamin and incorporated in statutes on this subject: If the defect is discoverable by simple observation then the law will imply no warranty against its existence. The opinion in that case characterizes implied warranty liability as an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor, and relates this liability to "'the reliance by the buyer on the seller's judgment," but does not in terms or by implication limit such liability to the situation where a dealer or manufacturer could, by reasonable care or "application of human skill," have known of the danger. Whether or not reliance is justified, when the defect is one which a purchaser need not reasonably expect, would depend not on the actual state of human or industrial knowledge, which may be quite unknown to the purchasing public

---

9 5th ed., Ch. III, 595-651.

10 Fla. 1952, 58 So. 2d 434, containing the following general comment:

> "It has been said that the concept of implied warranty rests upon the foundation of business ethics and constitutes an exception to the maxim 'let the buyer beware,' itself encompassing the idea that there is no warranty implied with respect to the quality of the goods being sold. To come into play, the exception must therefore spring from some moral obligation on the part of the seller, or perhaps more accurately, on the breach of some such duty amounting to fraud or the taking advantage of the buyer by reason of some superior knowledge in the seller, or the reliance by the buyer on the seller's judgment."

generally, but on what information the buyer may, under the circumstances, reasonably suppose the seller has.[11]

In sum, our case law affirmatively supports and indicates no departure from the rule that implied warranty liability is not limited by the foreseeability doctrine, the "reasonable application of human skill and foresight" test of tort liability:

> ". . . The warranty of merchantable quality does not, rest, and from the beginning did not rest, upon any such basis. It is a matter of contract, of interpretation of the language used in the light of the fact that the seller is a dealer, and dealers deal in merchantable goods. The only 'reliance' which it involves is reliance upon the seller's undertaking, as it is reasonably understood by the buyer. The pleasant sound of 'fitness for the purpose' should not be allowed to divert attention from one warranty to the other, or to obscure the fact that goods are merchantable only if they are fit for ordinary use. . . ."[12]

---

[11] Cf. Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., note 8 supra. For a statement of the converse question of what a seller may reasonably expect a purchaser to know, especially with regard to substances natural to a product, see Frumer and Friedman, note 2 supra, Vol. I, p. 671:

> "Probably the most thorough analysis and attack upon the 'foreign-natural' test is made in the recent decision in Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp. [103 N. W. 2d 64 (Wis 1960)] The Wisconsin court, in that case, in a very extensive discussion, refused to hold that there was no breach of warranty or negligence as a matter of law where injury was caused by a chicken bone in a chicken sandwich. The court adopted the test of 'reasonable expectation,' stating:
>
> "'What is to be reasonably expected by the consumer is a jury question in most cases; at least, we cannot say as a matter of law that a patron of a restaurant must expect a bone in a chicken sandwich either because chicken bones are occasionally found there or are natural to chicken.'
>
> "This test as applied to an action for breach of the implied warranty is keyed to what is "reasonably fit."

[12] Prosser on Warranty, Vol. 27, pp. 117-168, Minn. Law Review

The contention that the wholesomeness of a product should be determined on any standard other than its actual safety for human consumption, when supplied for that purpose, is a novel proposition in our law, and one which we are persuaded has no foundation in the decided cases. To hold that prevailing industry standards supplant the ordinary standard of objective truth and proof, and should be conclusive on the issue of a product's reasonable fitness for human use or consumption, would be to shift to the purchaser the risk of whatever latent defectiveness may ultimately be proven by experience and advancement of human knowledge, a risk which we are convinced was was from the inception of the implied warranty doctrine intended to be attached to the mercantile function. There exists, we think, no real alternative and no valid objection to this distribution of the burden, if the public health is to be protected in any practical sense from exploitation by those who, for a profit motive, undertake to supply the vast and ever increasing variety of products which the people by unprecedented powers of commercial persuasion are daily urged to use and consume.

Accordingly, the question propounded to us, and found by us to be within the contemplation of our Rules, is answered in the affirmative as hereinabove set forth.

The Clerk of this Court shall forthwith transmit to the certifying Court a true copy hereof, and shall return to said Court any original papers or documents which may have been transmitted here for our inspection.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C.J., TERRELL, O'CONNELL and HOBSON (RET.), JJ., concur; THOMAS and CALDWELL, JJ., dissent.

APPENDIX D

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The Fifth Circuit

No. 19003

EDWIN GREEN, JR., as Administrator of the Estate of Edwin Green, Deceased, and MARY GREEN,

Appellants,

versus

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY

Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

(December 11, 1963.)

Before RIVES, CAMERON and BELL, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge: First, to the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida we wish to express publicly and with deep sincerity our appreciation for their answer to the question which we certified to that Court. See *Green v. American Tobacco Co.*, Fla. 1963, 154 So.2d 169; *Green v. American Tobacco Co.*, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F.2d 70, 86. That answer has saved this Court,

through the writer as its organ, from committing a serious error as to the law of Florida which might have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court of Florida has been a very real help in the administration of justice.

Since the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, the parties have submitted to this Court additional briefs and oral argument. The appellants, plaintiffs below, would have us enter judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of liability and remand the case to the district court solely for the ascertainment of damages. The appellee, defendant below, insists that the judgments for defendant should be affirmed on grounds other than that decided by the Supreme Court of Florida, or, if the judgments for defendant are not now affirmed, that the case should be remanded for a full new trial.

The Supreme Court of Florida answered in the affirmative the following question certified to it by this Court:

> "'Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reason-

able application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?'" 154 So.2d at 170.

The gist of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida is contained in the following response:

"Upon the critical point, our decisions conclusively establish the principle that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty, and the question certified must therefore be answered in the affirmative." 154 So.2d at 170, 171.

The Florida Court was careful to limit its decision to that single response, saying:

"We note at the outset that all questions of causation and privity are foreclosed by the terms of the question certified, which expressly assumes, as found by the jury's response to interrogatories in the trial of the cause, that defendant's cigarettes caused plaintiff's fatal cancer. We conclude also that the question thus framed does not present for our consideration the issue of whether the cigarettes which caused a cancer in this particular instance

were as a matter of law unmerchantable in Florida under the stated conditions, nor does it request a statement of the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of this case. The inquiry before us is, instead, limited to the status of Florida law upon imposition of liability 'as for breach of implied warranty' when the manufacturer or warrantor 'could not, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known of the danger.' . . .

". . . . As already indicated, we do not feel that, the inquiry in terms either requests a response on the ultimate issue of liability in this case or requires any comment on the disposition of issues between the court and jury under the law relating to scope and breach of the implied warranty that a product supplied for human consumption shall be reasonably fit and wholesome for that general purpose." 154 So.2d at 170, 171.

What issues, then remain in the case? Clearly, the only issues as to defendant's liability are those relating to implied warranty. As shown in our original opinion, *Green v. American Tobacco Company, supra*, 304 F.2d at p. 71, the plaintiffs asserted in separate counts six theories of liability, four of which were decided by the district court as matters of law against the plaintiff. On appeal, no error was claimed as to those rulings. The district court submitted the case to the jury upon only two

theories of liability, breach of implied warranty and negligence. On appeal the plaintiffs accepted the jury's finding that the defendant was not liable for negligence. The only theory of liability remaining in the case is that of implied warranty.

On Count 1 charging a breach of implied warranty, the jury returned general verdicts for the defendant and also answered the four written interrogatories submitted under Rule 49(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., which were quoted in our original opinion, 304 F.2d at 71, 72.

The defendant insists that the scope of its implied warranty was so limited that there was a total lack of evidence to support plaintiffs' claim of breach and, hence, that the judgments for the defendant must be affirmed notwithstanding the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida. In varying ways the defendant describes what it claims to be the limited scope of its implied warranty; e.g., (a) "that the article must be of the same quality, material, workmanship and availability for use as others sold under the same trade name"; (b) that "there was [no] foreign substance or . . . spoiled, contaminated or other substandard ingredient which caused the injury, and such substance or ingredient reflected a material difference between the article which caused the injury and the usual article sold under the same trade name"; (c) that "the Florida Supreme Court's rule is only that a product must be 'reasonably fit and wholesome' and have a 'reasonable fitness for human use or consumption'."

We need not review the Florida decisions as to the defendant's claimed limitations, such as those lettered (a) and (b), *supra;* for, whatever may be the general rule, very clearly the law of this case has established the scope of the implied warranty substantially as that lettered (c), *supra.*

There has never been presented by the evidence any contention that Lucky Strike cigarettes were more dangerous or had a greater propensity to cause lung cancer than cigarettes bearing other brand names. Nor has there been any contention that the cigarettes which Mr. Green smoked contained any foreign substance, or any spoiled, contaminated or other substandard ingredient which caused his injury and death. Instead, plaintiffs' contention from the beginning has been that cigarettes—not Lucky Strike cigarettes alone—cause lung cancer. If defendant's claimed limitations such as those lettered (a) and (b), *supra*, are true and sound limitations of the scope of its implied warranty, then the question which we certified to the Supreme Court of Florida and the responsive opinion of that Court have been mere useless abstractions.

In submitting the case to the jury, the district court charged as follows:

> "The manufacturer of products which are offered for sale to the public in their original package for human consumption or use *impliedly warrants that its products are reasonably wholesome or fit*

for the purpose for which they are sold, but such implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured product, the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or foresight can afford knowledge." (Emphasis supplied.)

That instruction was taken verbatim from plaintiffs' requested written charge No. 11 (R. pp. 1127, 1128), as to which the plaintiffs consented to the insertion of the adverb "reasonably" to modify "wholesome or fit" (R. p. 1075). The defendant made no objection to that part of the charge which we have emphasized, *supra*. That part was also substantially included in plaintiffs' requested but refused Charge No. 10 (R. p. 1126). As a part of the law of this case the parties are, therefore, bound by the scope of the implied warranty as so defined by the district court.

Further, while the Supreme Court of Florida, in its advisory opinion, declined to pass on the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of this case, its footnote 11 (154 So.2d 172) impliedly rejected the "foreign-natural" test, and in the last quotation which we have made from the opinion, *supra* p. 2, it referred to " . . . the implied warranty that a product supplied for human consumption shall be reasonably fit and wholesome for that general purpose." That is, we conclude, a correct definition of the scope of the implied warranty under the law of Florida. See *McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corporation*, Fla. 1962, 137 So.2d 563, 565. Certainly it is the definition by which the parties are bound as a part of the law of this case.

The defendant argues, however, that, even under that definition, it was entitled to a directed verdict because there was no evidence that Lucky Strike cigarettes were not "*reasonably* fit and wholesome." To products intended for human consumption, and the use of which may cause injury or death, the jury may properly apply a very strict standard of reasonableness.

Without examining the other voluminous evidence, a single reference to the testimony of Dr. Ernest L. Wynder will suffice to show that there was evidence from which the jury could properly conclude that the standard of reasonableness had been breached. Dr. Wynder testified that "smoking was a main factor in lung cancer" (R. 119); that the "risk of a very heavy smoker to develop lung cancer is at least twenty times greater than a non-smoker" (R. 135); that "the major cause of epidermoid lung cancer in man is cigarette smoking" (R. 142); that "the major factor that produces lung cancers in American males is smoking" (R. 186). Dr. Wynder conceded "that the vast majority of smokers do not get lung cancer" (R. 186, 187), but by "vast majority" he meant that "one in nine or one in ten" do develop lung cancer. (R. 188) If the jury agreed with the testimony of Dr. Wynder, it could have reasonably inferred that the cigarettes were not "*reasonably* fit and wholesome." We conclude that the defendant was not entitled to directed verdicts on any of the grounds urged. We agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that "the general verdict for defendant was responsive to the trial court's instruction that 'implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured product the harmful

effects of which no developed human skill or foresight can afford knowledge.'" 154 So.2d at 170. In conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida that that instruction was erroneous, the judgments for the defendant must be reversed.

It does not, however, follow, as urged by the plaintiffs, that we should render judgments for plaintiffs on the issue of liability. The jury has not made any sufficient finding on the question of reasonableness, that is, as to whether or not the cigarettes were "*reasonably* fit and wholesome." The jury did find that the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent, Green, was a proximate cause of the development of cancer in his left lung which caused his death. It is possible, however, that those findings are consistent with the standard of reasonableness, for as this Court recently said: "Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without regard to negligence, 'does not mean that goods are warranted to be foolproof or incapable of producing injury . . . .'" *Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company*, 5 Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 19, 37.

The plaintiffs urge that the defendant waived any further finding on the question of reasonableness by not requesting the submission of any interrogatory in addition to the four quoted in our original opinion, 304 F.2d at 71, 72. It must be remembered, however, that the district court did not require the jury "to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon *each issue of fact*" as permitted by Rule 49(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., but, instead, followed the procedure outlined in Rule 49(b)

to "submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms of a general verdict, written interrogatories *upon one or more issues of fact* the decision of which is necessary to a verdict." It appears from the district court's charge to the jury that the written interrogatories were not intended to cover each and every issue of fact, but, "they are interrogatories which counsel described in their arguments, seeking to find from you your opinion on *certain factual matters* that have occurred in this trial." (Emphasis supplied.) It undoubtedly is true that the interrogatories submitted what the parties then considered to be the prime or important issue of fact, but, in the absence of any other evidence of waiver, and in the light of that part of the court's charge submitting the issue of reasonableness to the jury, which has been quoted, *supra* p. 4, we conclude that the defendant is not foreclosed from urging that issue on another trial. As said in *Moulor v. American Life Insurance Co.*, 1884, 111 U.S. 335, 337, the defendant's "willingness, at one trial, to risk its case before the jury, upon a single one of several issues made, did not preclude it, at a subsequent trial, from insisting upon other defences, involving the merits, which had not been withdrawn of record, or abandoned in pursuance of an agreement with the plaintiff."[1]

With much force, the plaintiffs urge that "relitigation of defendant's liability herein would be unusually onerous because of the enormous amount of time, energy, and

[1]To similar effect, see Chase v. United States, 1921, 256 U.S. 1, 10; Davis v. O'Hara, 1924, 266 U.S. 314, 321; 5 Am.Jur. 2d Appeal and Error, §955 p. 382, n. 12; 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error, §1989, p. 637, n. 25.

money required." The former trial took ten days, most of the time being devoted to issues relevant to liability vel non. As said in our original opinion, "the testimony at the trial was concerned principally with the issues of whether Mr. Green's death was caused by a cancer originating in the lung, that is, primary lung cancer, and whether that cancer was caused by his smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes. Eight eminent medical doctors testified on each side." 304 F.2d at 72. A large part of the burden and expense necessary to be incurred by any of the parties may be obviated by observing that upon another trial, any party may introduce such part of the relevant evidence on the former trial as may be desired.

Further, while the general verdicts for the defendant are vacated, the parties are nonetheless bound by the jury's answers to the written interrogatories. The answers to (1), (2) and (3) (304 F.2d 71, 72) will be directly pertinent upon another trial. The parties may not re-litigate the issues thus already decided under the guise of presenting evidence on the issue of reasonableness, that is, as to whether the cigarettes were *reasonably* fit and wholesome. The evidence to be adduced on that issue must assume as already conclusively established the issues decided by interrogatories (1), (2) and (3).

While the answer to interrogatory (4) no longer has any relevance to the question of defendant's liability, it does, in our opinion, effectively foreclose another issue which the defendant now urges; that is, that "plaintiff

would have to satisfy the jury . . . that Mr. Green purchased Lucky Strike cigarettes 'in reliance upon' defendant's implied warranty."

The element of "reliance" in implied warranty liability is touched upon by the Supreme Court of Florida in its response, 154 So.2d at 172, 173. It is said that this liability is related to "the reliance by the buyer on the seller's judgment." Reference is made to an article by Dean Prosser in which he says: "The only 'reliance' which it involves is reliance upon the seller's undertaking, as it is reasonably understood by the buyer." The opinion refers also to the decision in *Lamber v. Sistrunk*, Fla. 1952, 58 So.2d 434, denying a merchant's liability for sale of a defective stepladder. In that case the Florida Court drew the distinction between the class of cases where the buyer relies on the seller's judgment and those in which there is no reliance, as follows:

> "There is no need to dwell on the class of cases where the buyer relies upon the seller's judgment of the fitness of a particular article for the purpose intended, because the use of a stepladder is as well known to a buyer as to a seller and is as limited as it is well known. This feature is common to the lipstick involved in Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., supra [198 So.2d 225]. The difference, as we have already observed, is in the nature of the articles sold. One cannot know the ingredients of a lipstick without chemical analysis. One can know as much as a salesman of a stepladder by simply looking at it. And this lack

of opportunity to inspect was also a factor in the case of Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra [19 So.2d 313]."

Lambert v. Sistrunk, supra, 58 So.2d 435.

Again the response of the Supreme Court of Florida in this case states that " . . . the basis of such liability is the undertaking or agreement, attributed by law, to be responsible in the event the thing sold is not in fact merchantable or fit for its ordinary use or purposes." 154 So.2d at 171. While the response advises that ". . . . manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty . . . " (154 So.2d at 170), it would appear that the buyer is assumed to rely upon the seller's judgment in cases where the buyer neither knows nor has an opportunity to know of the unfitness or unwholesomeness. In such cases there is an undertaking or agreement on the part of the seller to be responsible in the event the cigarettes (to be specific) are not in fact reasonably wholesome or fit for human consumption.

It would be obviously impossible for the plaintiffs to prove any conscious or express reliance by Mr. Green on defendant's implied warranty. What the evidence does establish, and what the jury has in effect found, is that the circumstances of this case are such that it must be assumed that Mr. Green purchased the Lucky Strike cig-

arettes "in reliance upon" the defendant's implied warranty. That is no longer an issue in this case.

Finally, pointing to plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 10, the defendant insists that before finding for the plaintiffs, the jury must find that the cigarettes caused injury "while being used in a normal manner." A plea of contributory negligence is obviously inapposite to a claim based on breach of implied warranty. However, an implied warranty encompasses only the ordinary use or purposes for which the article is sold. It seems to us that Mr. Green's smoking of the Lucky Strike cigarettes, as described in our original opinion (304 F.2d at 72), even to the extent of from one to three packages per day, was so clearly a matter to be expected among many smokers, and within the use or purposes for which the cigarettes were sold, as not to leave this element as a real issue in the case, unless on another trial a different state of facts is presented.

We believe that we have discussed all of the remaining issues suggested by the defendant. We have done so in the hope of more sharply defining the issues yet to be decided. It is our purpose, however, to aid, and not to limit more strictly than necessary the judgment and discretion of the district court. In simple summary, the parties are bound by the answers to the four interrogatories; any issue not inconsistent with those answers may be presented upon another trial. What has been said should be a sufficient guide for the district court, by further pretrial hearing or otherwise, to keep the issues within proper limits.

The judgments are reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

CAMERON, Circuit Judge, Concurring in part and in part dissenting.

The majority opinion in this case is a careful and accurate portrayal of the status of the case as it now stands before us. And it is a correct interpretation of the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida so far as it holds that the judgments of the court below must be reversed and the case remanded. I cannot join, however, in its conclusion that we should not render judgments for plaintiffs on the issue of liability.

I.

For convenience, I quote the paragraph of the majority opinion which announces this latter conclusion—the point at which I am compelled to part company with my brethren:

> "It does not, however, follow, as urged by the plaintiffs, that we should render judgments for plaintiffs on the issue of liability. The jury has not made any sufficient finding on the question of reasonableness, that is, as to whether or not the cigarettes were '*reasonably* fit and wholesome.' The jury did find that the smoking of Lucky Strike Cigarettes on the part of the dece-

dent, Green, was a proximate cause of the development of cancer in his left lung which caused his death. It is possible, however, that those findings are consistent with the standard of reasonableness, for as this Court recently said: 'Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without regard to negligence, "does not mean that goods are warranted to be foolproof or incapable of producing injury . . . "' Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 5 Cir., 1963, 317 F.2d 19, 37."

In order to demonstrate that *Lartigue* is not authority in this case, and that the majority fell into fatal error when it announced the foregoing quoted language as the basis for its conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a directed verdict on liability, it is necessary to set out substantially all of the paragraph in *Lartigue*, a portion of which the majority has quoted above. This is done in a footnote, and the textbook language which *Lartigue* quoted is italicized to separate it from this Court's language (317 F.2d 37, paragraph numbered [18].[1] *Lartigue* was quoting from a textbook based upon a Cali-

[1] "Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without regard to negligence, *'does not mean that goods are warranted to be foolproof or incapable of producing injury * * * By and large, the standard of safety of the goods is the same under the warranty theory as under the negligence theory.37'* The article sold must be unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary consumer, with the knowledge common to the community as to its characterization. For example, sugar is unwholesome to diabetics. Ice cream and butter may contain sufficient cholesterol to be unwholesome to persons with high blood pressure, and heart trouble. Whiskey is unwholesome to alcoholics. Diabetics who eat sugar, heart cases who cannot resist ice cream or butter, and alcoholics who drink too much

fornia Appellate Court case which announced law which is wholly inconsistent with the law of Florida.

It is fair to say, I think, that the majority's entire reliance on *Lartigue* and the principles it stands for are in direct conflict with the decisions of Florida courts, including the specific holding of its Supreme Court in its answer to the question we certified to it (154 So.2d 169, 172-173).

II.

The majority here finds itself, I submit with deference, in the anomalous position of resting its decision as to the most crucial point in this case upon *Lartigue*, which in turn went astray because it bottomed its holding on the portion (304 F.2d at 73-77) of this Court's *original* opinion which was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court upon our submission to it. The vital language of *Lartigue* (317 F.2d 37-39) was based upon, and in considerable part repeated, these rejected holdings of this Court's original opinion.

---

whiskey know that the strict warranty of unwholesomeness puts no money in the bank for them.

"3 2 Harper & James, Law of Torts, § 28.22, p. 1584 (1961).

"'*In a recent California case the Court said "The essential inquiry, thus, is the same in respect to the breach of warranty theory as to the negligence claim: whether the defendant complied with the standard of reasonable care in ascertaining the fitness of the chattel for the use for which he knew it was hired." Tierstein v. Licht, 1959, 174 Cal. App.2d 835, 345 P.2d 341.*'"

It follows, it therefore seems to me, that whatever may be the force of *Lartigue*—decided two months before the Florida Supreme Court answered our question—in deciding a Louisiana case, it is no authority at all in this case based upon Florida law. Under that law it is not true that "By and large, the standard of safety of the goods is the same under the warranty theory as under the negligence theory." The direct opposite is true. The instruction given by the court below and its accompanying Question No. 4 were predicated directly upon the negligence theory. Florida rejects that theory and holds that sales of goods for human consumption are not covered by the law of sales with its *caveat emptor* or the law of negligence with its doctrines of reasonable care. Instead, they are controlled entirely by the law of contracts. The contract here was between the Tobacco Company and Green. The warranty embodied by the law in every sale the Company made to him was that the cigarettes purchased by him would not do him harm.

It would, in my opinion, be a complete rejection of the law of warranty to hold that it could abrogate the requirement that one admittedly injured by the use of tobacco could not recover unless he showed further that the cigarettes were not reasonably fit and wholesome for use by the general public. Those words are used in the warranty to demonstrate the universality of its application. Every sale it makes carries a warranty to each and every member of the public. But each warranty is separate and covers the liability of the Tobacco Company to each

separate individual to whom a sale is made. The finding of the jury has settled the fact that the cigarettes sold to Green were not reasonably fit and wholesome for use by him. No other question is, in my opinion, involved under the law of Florida with which alone we are dealing.

III.

The question here under consideration is, in reality, the same question which was debated at great length between the majority and the dissenting opinions in the initial decision of this case by this Court.[2] A reading of those two opinions will, it seems to me, cover essentially the point of difference which still persists between the majority and myself. I think no good purpose will be served by repeating the argument made in that dissent and that it is sufficient to refer to it. I undertook to analyze every applicable Florida case and to demonstrate that under the Florida cases, Question No. 4 should not have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court of Florida has decided the point submitted against the holding of the majority in that case and in favor of the arguments set forth in my dissent.

In answer to the question we addressed to the Supreme Court of Florida, which the parties stipulated as encompassing the question which would decide the outcome of this litigation, the Supreme Court of Florida answered in effect as follows:

[2]Green v. American Tobacco Company, June, 1962, 304 F.2d 70, dissenting opinion, 77.

> Yes, the law of Florida imposes on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not, on or before February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application human skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the mainstream smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung.

It seems certain that, when we submitted that question, the members of the Court thought its answer would dispose of the case. The parties evidently thought the same thing, because they agreed to the asking of this question. I see nothing else for the jury to pass upon, unless the Tobacco Company is to be permitted to bring in a hundred or a thousand witnesses whom Lucky Strike Cigarettes have not yet harmed, in an effort to show that the warranty given by the Tobacco Company to Green was not in fact broken.

But the record before us reveals no effort by either party to show that the cigarettes were not reasonably fit and wholesome as to any person besides Green. If that be the thrust of the majority opinion, I think it is fair to

say that neither party raised such an issue in the arguments before us on the trial of the original appeal; that this Court never conceived that such an issue was in the case; that the Supreme Court of Florida has not intimated that such an issue does remain in the case, and that no Florida decision is cited—and none can be found by me—which holds such an issue to be relevant to a trial upon implied warranty.

The law seems to be settled that:

> "In civil cases it is a well-recognized rule that questions not advanced on the original hearing will not be considered on the petition for a rehearing . . . " 5 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 987, page 412.

I think that the judgment below should be reversed and remanded for trial of the issue of damages alone. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

October Term, 1963

No. 19003

D. C. Docket Nos. 8070-M-Civil & 8505-M-Civil

EDWIN GREEN, JR., as Administrator of the Estate of Edwin Green, Deceased, and MARY GREEN,

Appellants,

versus

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,

Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before RIVES, CAMERON and BELL, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, on rehearing and reargument by counsel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgments of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same are hereby, reversed; and that this cause be, and it is hereby remanded to the said District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.

It is further ordered and adjudged that the appellee, American Tobacco Company, be condemned to pay the costs of this cause in this Court for which execution may be issued out of the said District Court.

"Cameron, Circuit Judge, Concurs in part and dissents in part"

December 11, 1963

Issued as Mandate:

LIBRARY
SUPREME COURT, U. S.

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAY 13 1964
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1963

No. 997

MARY GREEN and EDWIN GREEN, JR., as Administrator of the Estate of EDWIN GREEN, Deceased,

Petitioners,

—v.—

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD R. NEAHER
25 Broadway
New York 4, New York
Counsel for Respondent

JANET C. BROWN
EDWARD C. McLEAN, JR.

CHADBOURNE, PARKE, WHITESIDE & WOLFF
25 Broadway
New York 4, New York
Of Counsel

Dated: May 13, 1964

INDEX

PAGE

Citation to Opinions Below 2

Reasons for Denying the Cross Petition

1. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Defendant's liability 2

2. The Supposed Conflict With Florida Law Is Non-existent 6

Conclusion 8

Certificate of Service 9

Citations

McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp., Fla. 1962, 137 So. 2d 563 7

Other Authority

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(b) 4, 5

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1963

No. 997

MARY GREEN and EDWIN GREEN, JR., as Administrator of the Estate of EDWIN GREEN, Deceased,

Petitioners,

—v.—

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners in this Cross Petition were the plaintiffs below* and are the respondents to a petition by this respondent (No. 961), defendant below,* for a writ of certiorari to review the same judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which is the subject of the Cross Petition. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, defendant submits that the Cross Petition presents no independent question warranting review by this Court, and that the only reasons for the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction are those set forth in the Petition in No. 961.

---

* Petitioners in No. 997 will accordingly be hereinafter referred to as "plaintiffs" and respondent as "defendant."

Citation to Opinions Below

The opinions below are printed in the Appendices of the Cross Petition and are reported as cited therein (Cr. Pet., pp. 1-2).*

Reasons for Denying the Cross Petition

1. *Plaintiffs Have Not Established Defendant's Liability*

Plaintiffs acknowledge this to be an action for "breach of implied warranty" and that that is the sole theory of defendant's alleged "liability" to plaintiffs (Cr. Pet., p. 5)—obviously an issue still to be resolved by a jury in this case because the former jury's general verdicts for defendant have been vacated (Cr. Pet. App. D, p. 52).

Despite that acknowledgment, and its logical consequence, plaintiffs repeat as a basis for review by this Court the selfsame argument rejected below, namely, that from their view of the Florida law the jury had already decided the liability issue in plaintiffs' favor when it answered the first three of the four interrogatories which accompanied its general verdicts in favor of defendant (Cr. Pet., pp. 7, 13). In so contending, plaintiffs not only disregard the limited nature of those factual matters; they completely overlook their own statement of their implied warranty claim. And their conception of Florida warranty law is belied by the very advisory opinion they say the court below did not follow (*infra*, pp. 6-7).

Plaintiffs' implied warranty claim in their amended complaint (R. 4-5) shows that this case cannot be reduced to the three factual matters plaintiffs urge as a finding

* References to the Cross Petition and Appendices are denoted by "Cr. Pet." and "Cr. Pet. App. ——".

of liability (Cr. Pet., pp. 5, 7, 12-13). Their claim alleged in substance that defendant, "possessed of superior knowledge concerning the nature and the manufacture of Lucky Strike cigarettes", thereby "impliedly warranted [they] were fit and safe for human consumption"; that plaintiffs' decedent, Edwin Green, "had no knowledge of or ordinary means to determine" their fitness and "relied" on the warranty in smoking them; that the cigarettes contained "numerous substances which were harmful to the human body" when "used for the purpose and in the manner intended"; that as a result of the foregoing, Green either contracted lung cancer or a pre-existing dormant cancer was activated, which caused his death (R. 4-5).

The four interrogatories plaintiffs refer to (Cr. Pet., p. 5) manifestly did not embrace all the elements of plaintiffs' implied warranty claim. And as both the District Court and the Court of Appeals emphasized (R. 1124; Cr. Pet. App., p. 58), those interrogatories were not intended to cover each and every issue of fact the first jury—or any jury—had to pass upon to resolve the ultimate issue of defendant's liability upon the theory of breach of implied warranty.

Nor is it fair to imply that the District Court's failure to accept and apply the Florida law of warranty was responsible for the fourth interrogatory, thereby assuring a general verdict for defendant on the sole basis of the knowledge issue (Cr. Pet., pp. 6, 7, 8). The fourth interrogatory was responsive to the element of defendant's knowledge pleaded by plaintiffs as part of their warranty claim (R. 4) and the subject of proof by them at trial. Indeed, the knowledge element was one they told the jury it had to decide (R. 35-6).*

* In opening to the jury, plaintiffs' counsel told them (R. 35-6): "We have also separately charged that they have impliedly warranted that they are fit and safe for human consumption

Moreover, it is impossible to say what the jury's general verdict would have been had the fourth interrogatory been omitted.* Certainly plaintiffs would be in no better position if only interrogatories 1, 2 and 3 had been submitted and answered and the same general verdicts for defendant returned. In such case, plaintiffs would not have been entitled to a partial judgment on the issue of liability, notwithstanding the general verdicts. Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as plaintiffs acknowledge (Cr. Pet., p. 7, fn. 2), provides in effect that the general verdict may be disregarded only when the answers are consistent with each other, but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict.

That rule could not avail plaintiffs on the basis of the answers to interrogatories 1, 2 and 3 because it could not be said as a matter of Florida law that such answers are inconsistent with a general verdict for defendant. The reason is plain: the jury's verdict for defendant might well have rested also upon findings that despite any effects of smoking defendant's cigarettes upon Mr. Green, those cigarettes were nonetheless reasonably fit and wholesome for the purpose for which they were sold and that no breach of implied warranty by defendant was the proximate cause of injury to Mr. Green. These were equally essential factual matters involved in plaintiffs' claim which were put to the jury by the trial court's charge and left for decision by general verdict rather than written interrogatory (R. 1115, 1117).

"The issue is whether the manufacturer knew of these harmful substances in the product and either failed to remove it or failed to warn the public, including Edwin Green, of these harmful substances."

* The alternative of an affirmative answer regarding defendant's knowledge need not be considered in view of the Florida Supreme Court's advisory ruling that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge is irrelevant (Cr. Pet., p. 6).

Finally, nothing plaintiffs cite, and nothing we have seen, supports a construction of Rule 49(b) which would authorize any court to ignore any interrogatory after the jury has answered it, then assume that the general verdicts were based on that interrogatory, rather than on different and unrelated questions presented by the charge on warranty, and thereby create an inconsistency between the answers to the remaining interrogatories and the general verdicts.

Plaintiffs betray their awareness of the incomplete factual foundation of their position by their assiduous efforts throughout to exaggerate the import of interrogatory 3 (Cr. Pet., pp. 2, 3, 5, 9, 13, 14).

First, the answer to that interrogatory is not a finding that Green's lung cancer or death was proximately caused by any breach of implied warranty on defendant's part. Under the trial court's charge, the general verdict negates such an interpretation of the jury's answer.

Second, the answer to interrogatory 3 is not even an unequivocal finding that smoking defendant's cigarettes was "the proximate cause" of Green's lung cancer. As the interrogatory plainly leaves open, the jury may well have considered smoking was but "one of the proximate causes" under all the facts and circumstances. Thus the supposed incongruity between "lethal" cigarettes and "reasonable fitness" under Florida law is but the product of plaintiffs' speculation.

Third, there is no dichotomy between "reasonable fitness" as to Green and "as to the public generally" as plaintiffs suppose (Cr. Pet., pp. 3, 7, 8). Unless plaintiffs sustain their burden of proving to a jury's satisfaction that under all the facts and circumstances defendant's cigarettes were not of "ordinary," merchantable quality, i.e., reasonably fit and wholesome for their general purpose and that

such breach was the proximate cause of Green's injury (Cr. Pet. Apps., pp. 43, 45-46), they have not proved a case. Interrogatory 3 does not on its face supply that finding under Florida law or otherwise.

2. *The Supposed Conflict With Florida Law Is Non-existent*

The court below on re-hearing certified but a single question to the Florida Supreme Court, namely, the question of implied warranty law on which it had previously affirmed the judgments for defendant (Cr. Pet. App. 38). That question was addressed to "The fundamental point upon which plaintiffs rely on this appeal," i.e., that the trial court had erred in ruling that a manufacturer's implied warranty "does not cover deleterious substances in its products, the harmful effects of which are unknown to the manufacturer and could not have been known by any developed skill and foresight" (Cr. Pet. App. 5-6).

That is the only question answered by the Florida Supreme Court's advisory opinion (Cr. Pet. App. 43). In light of that court's ruling on the question certified, the Court of Appeals below concluded that the judgments for defendant must be reversed, the jury's verdicts vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because it considered that the error in the trial court's charge complained of by plaintiffs had been confirmed:

> "The court below unquestionably did not depart from the Florida law in so deciding. The 'conflict' plaintiffs see between that decision and the law of Florida (including the Florida Supreme Court's advisory opinion in this case) is entirely of their own creation (Cr. Pet., p. 8 *et seq.*). The supposed conflict springs from the same technique of reading into the advisory opinion more than is there, just as plaintiffs have dealt with the written interrogatories.

Neither the Florida Supreme Court's advisory opinion nor the earlier Florida cases hold that "the ordinary merchantability warranty involved in the instant case" (Cr. Pet. App. 45-6) would be breached as a matter of law by reason of circumstances disclosed in the jury's answers to the written interrogatories. This entire premise of plaintiffs' "conflict" argument is squarely refuted by the Florida Supreme Court itself. As that court said, "the question thus framed does not present for our consideration the issue of whether the cigarettes which caused a cancer in this particular instance were as a matter of law unmerchantable in Florida under the stated conditions, * * *" (Cr. Pet. App. 43). The court clearly indicated the limited nature of the inquiry before it, i.e., only the so-called knowledge issue, and declined even to state "the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of this case" or to "comment on the disposition of issues between the court and jury under the law relating to scope and breach of the implied warranty" involved (Cr. Pet. App. 43-4).

The Florida Supreme Court advisory opinion, moreover, confirms the importance under Florida warranty law of the "reasonable fitness" question which the court below ordered retried. Although the Florida Supreme Court declined to define precisely the "scope" of the warranty involved, it nevertheless pointed out "that a product supplied for human consumption shall be reasonably fit and wholesome for that general purpose" (Cr. Pet. App. 44). The terms "merchantability", sometimes used by the court, means the same thing. Thus Justice Drew, who wrote the advisory opinion, defined "the warranty of merchantability, implied by law," to mean that the article sold "was reasonably fit to be used for the purpose for which it was sold." *McBarnette v. Paramount Equipment Corp.*, Fla. 1962, 137 So. 2d 563, 565.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in No. 997 should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

EDWARD R. NEAHER
25 Broadway
New York 4, New York
Counsel for Respondent

JANET C. BROWN
EDWARD C. McLEAN, JR.

CHADBOURNE, PARKE, WHITESIDE & WOLFF
25 Broadway
New York 4, New York
Of Counsel

Dated: May 13, 1964

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Cross Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was served by mail this 13th day of May, 1964 upon Neal P. Rutledge, 111 N.E. 1st Street, Miami, Florida, and upon Lawrence V. Hastings, 312 Biscayne Building, Miami, Florida, counsel of record for petitioners herein, by depositing the same in a United States mail box at 25 Broadway, New York 4, N. Y., in a wrapper addressed to each of said counsel as aforesaid with sufficient airmail postage prepaid.

EDWARD R. NEAHER
Counsel for Respondent

Dated: May 13, 1964